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This dissertation explores several related themes in international economics and 
focuses on uncovering the impacts of government actions on multinational firms’ trade 
and investment decisions. 
In the first essay “Country-level Property Rights Protection and behavior of 
Multinational Enterprises” I provide the motivation for the other two chapters of this 
dissertation, and explain why I have chosen country level property rights protection to 
explain heterogeneity in the behavior of multinational enterprises.  
In the second essay “The role of Intellectual Property Rights in the relation 
between Foreign Direct Investment and Growth” I study the relation between strength of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, foreign direct investments (FDI) by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and country-level economic development. The existing 
theoretical literature predicts that the welfare implications of IPR reform are ambiguous, 
and depend on the extent of FDI in the IPR-reforming country. However, both firm- and 
industry-level analyses find that stricter IPR laws increase industrial development, 
especially among multinational firms in technology-intensive industries. In this paper I 
examine whether the impact of tighter IPR on GDP and TFP growth is different for 
countries with different levels of FDI, because general equilibrium considerations might 
offset or even reverse the partial equilibrium effects found by the micro literature. Using 
dynamic panel data techniques and a sample of 103 countries over 1970-2009, I find that 
although FDI and IPR have positive effects on economic growth for most of the 
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countries, stronger IPR mitigates the growth effect of FDI. Moreover, at the highest 
observed levels of FDI, it appears that more lax IPR increases the growth rate. The 
mitigating effect of IPR on growth effect of FDI works through capital accumulation as 
well as improvements in TFP. 
In the third essay “Political limits on the World Oil Trade: Firm-level Evidence 
from US firms” I analyze how international politics affects trade patterns. I construct a 
firm-level dataset for U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2010 to test whether the 
state of international relations with the trading partners of the U.S. affect the import 
behavior of U.S. firms. To measure “political distance” between the U.S. and its trading 
partners I use voting records from the UN General Assembly. I find that U.S. firms 
import significantly less oil from political opponents of the U.S. My conjecture is that the 
decrease in oil imports is mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated U.S. firms that 






I wish to thank my committee members, Dr. Kevin K. Tsui, Dr. Michael T. 
Maloney, Dr. Michal M. Jerzmanowski, and Dr. Scott L. Baier, for their advice and 
continuous support through the process of completing my dissertation work. I would 
especially like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Kevin K. Tsui, and thank him in 
abundance for his excellent advice and guidance. I am grateful to Dr. Maloney for his 
constant support, trust and encouragement throughout my graduate studies. 
 Finally, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the faculty members of the 
John E. Walker Department of Economics. I greatly benefited from their teaching and 
knowledge. I thank the John E. Walker Department of Economics for the financial 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TITLE PAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii 
CHAPTER 
1. COUNTRY-LEVEL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND BEHAVIOR 
      OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 
1.1.  Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 
1.2.  What do Governments need to know? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
 
2. THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE RELATION  
      BETWEEN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH . . . . . . . . . . .7 
 
2.1.  Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 
2.2.  Why might stronger IPR hurt growth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 
2.3.  Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 
2.4.  Empirical Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
2.5.  Sensitivity analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
2.6.  Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
 
3. POLITICAL LIMITS ON THE WORLD OIL TRADE: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE 
FROM US FIRMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 
 
3.1.  Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 
3.2.  Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 
3.3.  Empirical Analysis. . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 











APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 
 
A. Details of the essay “The Role of Intellectual Property rights in the relation  
between Foreign Direct Investment and Growth” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
 
A.1.    Sample 1 (103 countries) and sample 2 (79 countries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
A.2.    Data sources and descriptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 
A.3.    The Arellano-Bond GMM technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 
A.4.    Detail of the key variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
A.5.    Further robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 
 
 
B.  Details of the essay “Political limits on the World Oil Trade: Firm-level  
Evidence from US firms”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 
 







LIST OF TABLES 
 
2.1    Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37  
2.2    GDP growth, FDI and IPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 
2.3    TFP growth, FDI and IPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
2.4    Robustness checks: Domestic investment versus FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 
2.5    Robustness checks: Financial market development versus IPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
2.6    Robustness checks: IPR enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 
 
3.1    Descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 
3.2    Distances and US oil imports: Different imputation schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
3.3    Distances and US oil imports: Large firms as measured by average annual 
         imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
3.4    Distances and US oil imports: Large firms as measured by total imports. . . . . . . . 60 
3.5    Distances and US oil imports: Cold-war period (1986-1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
3.6    Distances and US oil imports: Post 9/11 period (2000-2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 




2.7    Further robustness checks: Cross-sectional setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 
2.8    Further robustness checks: Components of the Ginarte-Park index. . . . . . . . . . . . .76 
2.9    Further robustness checks: Standard errors clustered by country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 
2.10  Exploring the offsetting effects between FDI and IPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 
2.11  Further robustness checks: Discrete levels of IPR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
2.12  Further robustness checks: 10-year analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 
2.13  Detailed statistics for FDI and IPR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
2.1. Mean value of the Ginarte-Park index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
2.2. Standard deviation of the Ginarte-Park index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 










This dissertation explores several related themes in international economics and 
focuses on uncovering the impacts of government actions on multinational firms’ trade 
and investment decisions. This brief introduction describes the motivation for the 
following two chapters of this dissertation, and explains why I have chosen country level 
property rights protection to explain heterogeneity in the behavior of multinational 
enterprises. While in the main I have foregone exploring the effects of individual policy 
decisions, the contribution of my dissertation is to suggest that there are common 
principles which can be harnessed as the basis for construction of micro policy decisions 
with the aim of optimizing trade and foreign investment. 
The major reason why MNEs are very sensitive to shifts in property rights 
protection is because they can choose among multiple locations for their operations while 
domestic firms serve only their local markets. Countries with strict property rights 
protection (all else being equal) are commonly expected to attract a greater number of 
multinational enterprises, more investment, or investment with a higher content of 
intellectual property (i.e., technology, managerial expertise, trade secrets, etc.). Thus, 
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changes in the economic behavior of MNEs can be used as an analytical tool to reveal the 
real costs and benefits associated with a change in property rights protection in an MNE’s 
host country. 
Sometimes governments intentionally take actions that violate MNEs’ intellectual 
or tangible property rights. Such violations range from improper enforcement of de jure 
property rights, compulsory licensing of MNEs’ intellectual property, to forced takeovers 
of foreign owned property. On the other hand, it appears that many governments today 
are attempting to improve their property rights regimes in order to attract MNEs and with 
them their frontier technologies and commercial expertise (perhaps targeting specific 
industries or geographic regions with their policies). While sometimes done for political 
expedience or as a byproduct of other policy decisions, at other times governments 
clearly aim for desirable economic outcomes by loosening or tightening property rights 
protections. However, it is implied by my analysis that the effect can be diametrically 
different across countries and firms for the same set of policies, and that optimal property 
rights protection policy needs to be more systematized and evidentially based than it is at 
present.  
  Finally, while property rights protection is not easy to measure directly, one can 
find proxies for a shift in de facto property rights protection in a known direction, and 
analyze how MNEs react to the change in this proxy. In chapter 2 I use the Ginrte and 
Park (1997) index of intellectual property rights protection to measure variation among 
countries and across time, and this index is based on de jure patent laws. In chapter 3, 
instead of measuring property rights as they are on the books, I use the index of political 
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distance between countries to reflect shifts in property rights protection, with a larger 
political distance between governments raising the risks of hold-ups or expropriations of 
MNEs’ investments.  
In summary, in order to provide guidance for construction of more efficient 
property rights policies I have chosen to analyze changes in trade and investment 
behavior of multinational firms due to shifts in a host country property rights protection 
because: (i) governments appear to use property rights policy tools to affect companies’ 
trade and investment  decisions; (ii) MNEs are the most sensitive to shifts in property 
rights protection relative to firms that serve only their local markets since MNEs have 
freedom to choose countries with whom to trade or invest; (iii) while the best way to 
quantify property rights protection is not obvious, it is feasible to capture shifts in 
property rights by looking at changes in the behavior of multinational firms; (iv) and that 
it is possible to establish reasonably robust principles of the likely behavior of MNEs in 
response to a shift in a given country’s IPR regime given its unique set of economic 
circumstances. 
 
1.2. What do Governments need to know? 
In chapter 2, I study the relation between strength of IPR protection, foreign direct 
investments (FDI) by MNEs and country-level economic development. To measure IPR 
protection I use the Ginarte and Park (1997) index which is based on each country’s 
patent laws, so that amendments to the laws lead to a quantifiable improvement in or 
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deterioration of the GP-index. I find that most governments in the sample increase 
production and total factor productivity (TFP) by having a stronger IPR regime which is 
often associated with higher levels of attracted FDI as a percentage of GDP. However, for 
all countries in the sample I find that stronger IPR mitigates the growth effect of FDI, and 
at the highest levels of FDI it appears that more lax IPR increases the growth rate of a 
country. The moderating impact of IPR on the growth effect of FDI works through factor 
accumulation as well as improvements in TFP.  
This suggests one potential explanation for why certain countries in certain 
periods might choose a lax IPR regime. In particular, if a country is able to attract a 
significant amount of FDI without resorting to the IPR policy tool, by relaxing IPR 
protection, the total production in that country may be increased. In other words, based 
on the empirical findings of chapter 2 there are instances when lax IPR protection does 
not prevent MNEs from investing in a country, thus such a country is not penalized for its 
lax property rights system.   
While in chapter 2 I find that the growth effect from attracted FDI by MNEs is 
heterogeneous for different strengths of property rights protection, since I use aggregate 
FDI flows I cannot exclude possible endogeneity, i.e. MNEs might be attracted to fast-
growing markets. To overcome the endogeneity problem, in chapter 3 I analyze a firm-
level sample and search for changes in the trade behavior of multinational firms due to 
shifts in overall property rights protection perceived by MNEs. I focus on US oil-
importing firms because these firms are often engaged in backward vertical FDI and thus, 
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are directly exposed to changes in property rights protection, and because many of the 
world largest oil-firms are of US origin. 
I indirectly measure shifts in property rights protection of oil-exporting countries 
by using the index of political distance between the US government and other 
governments sourced from Dreher and Strum (2012). The index is based on countries’ 
votes in the UN General Assembly where votes in disagreement increase political 
distance between the states. When political distance between the US government and 
another oil-exporting government increases, oil-importing firms in my sample import 
significantly less oil. Moreover, this result is driven by large firms that are more likely to 
have overseas investments in oil extraction and thus, face hold-up and expropriation 
risks, i.e. experience deterioration in their perceived property rights protection when 
international relations between the US government and the MNEs’ host country worsen. 
While it is not obvious if this firm-level result means that the overall imports of 
an oil-exporting country would suffer as a result of worsened political relationship with 
the US, in chapter 3 I identified a clear negative relation between weaker property rights 
protection and the quantity of oil-imports by multinational firms. This finding, together 
with the empirical finding of chapter 2, reinforce the view that governments need to be 
acutely aware that changes to property rights produce impactful and observable changes 
on the investment and trade decisions of multinational firms. Furthermore, it appears that 
the relationship between changes in property rights protections and the effects of these 
changes are not necessarily linearly related, and can even yield the opposite of generally 
expected results.  
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Lastly, another of my research findings suggests that governments which have a 
higher likelihood of expropriating of foreign owned property invested on their territory 
also tend to have lax IPR protection (the correlation between the IPR index that I use in 
chapter 2 and the probability of expropriations happening is negative fifty percent). 
Given that expropriation is generally accepted to be damaging to investment and growth, 
while lax IPR can be beneficial in certain instances, it would appear that governments fail 
to tailor their policies optimally to their unique economic circumstances to capture the 
maximal effects of foreign direct investment and trade. This can be an area for further 
research aimed at fine-tuning the impact of property rights policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
The role of Intellectual Property Rights in the relation 
between Foreign Direct Investment and Growth 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This empirical study is motivated by the long-standing policy debate about the 
role of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in economic development. An 
extensive body of theoretical literature has emerged to tackle this question, but the 
predictions that follow from this literature are ambiguous. The recent endogenous growth 
models by Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998), among others, argue that the extent of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) attracted by an economy under a certain set of conditions 
determines the economic impact of IPR reform.  
In this paper I measure the general equilibrium effect of IPR policy on country 
growth, using a composite index of IPR protection (i.e., the Ginarte and Park (2008) 
index) and a sample of 103 countries (developed as well as developing) over the period 
of 1970-2009. As shown by Ginarte and Park (1997), IPR affects growth indirectly by 
stimulating the accumulation of physical and intellectual (research) capital. Building on 
their result, I further explore the total factor productivity (TFP) channel through which 
IPR might affect growth. However, Ginarte and Park (1997) do not investigate whether 
welfare implications of IPR reform are different for countries with different levels of 
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FDI. Guided by the theory that stresses the importance of FDI in measuring the total 
welfare effect of stronger IPR, my empirical growth model includes FDI inflows. To 
account for the heterogeneous effect of IPR reform on realized growth due to different 
levels of FDI, I interact IPR with FDI. Estimation is performed with the Arellano-Bond 
Dynamic Panel GMM estimator (Arellano, 1991) to control for possible endogeneity of 
FDI and IPR. 
The current paper complements the empirical findings by Branstetter et al (2006, 
2007, and 2010) and by Hu and Png (2010). These papers argue that stronger IPR 
protection stimulates industrial development. Branstetter et al. (2006, 2007, and 2010) 
use confidential firm-level data for US multinational enterprises (MNEs) and analyze 16 
distinct episodes of shifts in IPR regimes to find that, as a result of IPR reform, 
production by MNEs increases, industry-level value added increases and the production 
of new goods shifts toward the reforming countries. Hu and Png (2010) use a composite 
index of IPR protection (i.e., the Ginarte and Park (2008) index) and a sample of 72 
countries to show that more patent-intensive industries grow faster than less-patent 
intensive industries in countries with stronger patent rights.  
While these and other firm- and industry-level studies are important for revealing 
the channels through which stronger IPR protection influences production, micro-level 
studies do not account for general equilibrium considerations, which might offset or even 
reverse the partial equilibrium effects (Acemoglu, 2010).  In particular, the movement of 
capital between industries as a result of IPR reform is not accounted for in the firm- and 
industry-level studies discussed above. Also, for a fair policy-maker the interest likely 
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lies in promoting growth for the economy as a whole, but not to the benefit of certain 
industries. Thus, guided by the theoretical literature on the welfare implications of IPR 
protection and with respect to the gaps in the existing empirical literature, I measure the 
general equilibrium effect of stronger IPR protection for countries with differing levels of 
FDI. 
Empirical evidence shows that a 10 percentage point increase in a country’s ratio 
of FDI to GDP leads to an approximately 3 percentage point increase in growth and that a 
one standard deviation increase in IPR is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in 
growth. However, FDI and IPR have offsetting impacts on growth and at the highest 
levels of FDI, it appears that more lax IPR can in fact increase the growth rate. The 
mitigating impact of IPR on the growth effect of FDI is revealed in both GDP and TFP 
growth regressions, which means that the effect works through factor accumulation as 
well as through the improvements in TFP.  
My findings are consistent with the theory in terms of punctuating the importance 
of the level of FDI in determining the general equilibrium effect of IPR reform. However, 
it might first appear that my results contradict the prediction of the theory that the larger 
is the FDI channel of international technology diffusion, the more likely it is that stronger 
IPR laws increase production in the IPR-reforming country. While the models by 
Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998) predict that stronger IPR laws encourage FDI, there can 
be other exogenous factors that attract additional FDI, and these factors are not 
considered by these models. At the same time, the theory predicts that stronger IPR 
protection increases the cost of acquiring knowledge from all attracted FDI. Hence, if a 
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country is able to attract a significant amount of FDI without appealing to the IPR policy 
tool, by relaxing the IPR protection the total production in that country might be 
increased. This result does not contradict the main theory and is supported by the 
empirical findings of this paper. 
Section 2.2 reviews the most relevant literature on FDI, IPR and economic 
growth. Section 2.3 discusses data sources and their limitations. The empirical analysis is 
carried out in Section 2.4.  Robustness checks are executed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 
concludes the discussion. 
 
2.2. Why might stronger IPR hurt growth? 
The role of IPR policy in economic development is the focus of many theoretical 
studies.
1
 Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972) are among the earliest theoretical 
contributions on the economic impact of IPR policy. A strengthened patent system 
stimulates incentives for firms to innovate (i.e., a positive dynamic effect), but also 
increases the cost of acquiring knowledge and that of technology diffusion into the public 
domain (i.e., a negative static effect). The tradeoff between these opposing effects from 
strengthening IPR protection, as this theory argues, should be the rationale for an optimal 
IPR policy. However, this theory assumes a closed economy. 
More recent general equilibrium models by Helpman (1993) contribute to the 
long-standing debate on optimal IPR policy and aim to capture the non-monotonicity of 
                                                          
1
 The theoretical works on IPR and economic growth are part of the endogenous growth theory, which 
unites under the category a vast number of studies which stress the role of policy measures in explaining 
long-run country growth.   
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the IPR effect on growth in a North-South framework (assuming that innovation occurs 
predominantly in the North, while imitation is prevalent in the South). The study finds 
that tighter IPR is never in the interest of the South and can even hurt both regions under 
certain policy conditions. When the rate of imitation in the South is high to begin with, 
conflict between the South and the North arises over the desired level of IPR protection. 
However, in Helpman (1993) overall welfare implications of tighter IPR protection for 
the North and the South might change if FDI is made endogenous in the models  (i.e., the 
incentives of foreign firms to activate the FDI channels for technology transfer and 
incentives to innovate may respond to changes in IPR protection).
2
 Thus, the paper calls 
for more elaborate analysis of the total welfare effects of IPR reform, where the impact of 
IPR protection on FDI is accounted for. 
Indeed, Lai (1998) finds that the channel of technology transfer (i.e., FDI versus 
imitation) determines the overall welfare effect of a tighter IPR regime for the South. So, 
the growth models, where FDI does not respond endogenously to shifts in IPR policy 
(i.e., only the imitation channel of production transfer is considered), may render 
misleading conclusions. Lai (1998) finds that stronger IPR in the South may benefit the 
South if the FDI channel of international production transfer is sufficiently large 
                                                          
2
 While the theory posits that stronger IPR encourages FDI, empirical studies that analyze the impact of 
IPR on the volume of FDI do not find a robust relationship. Later studies (Javorcik, 2004, Nunnenkamp 
and Spatz, 2003, among others) suggest that the composition of FDI sectors, the types of FDI projects (i.e., 
distribution versus manufacturing), and (anecdotally) the type of FDI technology (new versus old) change 
when the IPR regime varies. In general, these changes rather are attributable to the quality shift in FDI 




compared to the imitation channel.
3
 But later, Lai (2008) analyzes the global IPR system 
and finds that the South is likely to be disadvantaged by efficient harmonization of IPR 
laws, while the gains of the North outweigh the losses of the South, resulting in an 
increase in global welfare. 
Branstetter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2007) also make FDI endogenous to IPR in 
their model, and further extend Lai (1998) by treating imitation as a costly activity. In 
their model stronger IPR increases the cost of imitation, which leads to reallocation of 
capital between imitation and other economic activities. Under reasonable 
parameterization, the increase in investments by multinational firms in the South offsets 
the decrease in Southern imitation, so overall production in the South increases. The 
North should also benefit in the long run because production shifting to the South frees 
up Northern resources for investment in innovation; however, Branstetter et al. (2007) do 
not estimate this long-run general equilibrium effect.  
It appears that current theoretical models give ambiguous predictions about the 
welfare effects of IPR reform. But in fact, the common conclusion from the theory is that 
the total impact of IPR reform on production growth likely depends on the extent of FDI 
in the IPR-reforming economy. While the empirical evidence from firm- and industry-
level studies suggest that tighter IPR protection stimulates industrial development, 
especially among multinational enterprises in technology intensive industries, it is not 
clear from these studies what the general equilibrium effect of IPR reform is. Also, there 
                                                          
3
 The finding that with a sufficiently high rate of imitation the South might be disadvantaged by IPR reform 
is similar to that of Helpman (1993) despite FDI being exogenous in the model by Helpman (1993). 
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is no evidence from cross-country studies about the impact of the level of attracted FDI 
on the total welfare effect of stronger IPR.  
By estimating a general equilibrium effect of IPR reform in countries with 
different levels of FDI, the current paper contributes empirically to the policy debate on 
the economic benefits of tighter IPR protection. In addition, this paper contributes to the 
literature on FDI knowledge spillovers, which finds surprisingly little robust evidence of 





 levels. It might be that the inconclusive results in the FDI knowledge 
diffusion literature can (at least partly) be explained by the differences in the IPR regimes 
among the countries.   
 
2.3. Data 
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis, specifically the 
measures of FDI, IPR protection, GDP and TFP growth rates. For the complete list of 
                                                          
4
 There is some evidence of a positive effect of FDI when host economies are sufficiently developed to 
interact with foreign firms. Borenzstein et al. (1998) find that only the countries with a minimum threshold 
of human capital can benefit from FDI spillovers. Similarly, Blomstrom (1994) suggests that only high-
income developing countries, but not low-income ones, enjoy growth benefits from FDI. Also, the ability 
of the recipient economies to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers depends on the level of 
development of financial markets (Alfaro, et al., 2004) and trade policy (Balasubramanyam, 1996) of a 
recipient economy. However, Carcovic and Levin (2002) question the validity of cross-section findings of 
the four above mentioned papers by pointing to the methodological problems peculiar to cross-section 
analysis. They do not find that the exogenous component of FDI exerts a robust, independent influence on 
growth. 
5
 The empirical evidence from industry- and firm-level studies on the economic effects of FDI is also 
mixed. Results are not robust to changes in methodology, countries and samples. Cross-sectional studies 
tend to find a positive effect of FDI on productivity, especially if industry rather than firm data are used. 
When panel techniques are applied the estimated spillover effect is either negative or undetermined. For 
further discussion, see Navaretti and Venables (chapter 7, 2004).  
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variables, their definitions and the sources of data, as well as more detailed discussion of 
certain covariates, see the Appendix A.  
The source of FDI data is United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s UNCTADstat data dissemination platform
6
, which reports annual inward 
and outward FDI flows for the period of 1970-2009 and FDI stocks for the period of 
1980-2009. Since this study analyzes the impact of IPR policy on an FDI-recipient 
economy, inward FDI are chosen for estimation
7
, and 1970 is the starting year in the final 
panel. To account for the size of the domestic market and to follow the growth literature, 
FDI is included in the regressions as a share of GDP.  
The literature widely uses the Ginarte and Park (1997) index of patent rights (GP) 
to study various economic effects of IPR protection.
8
 The updated GP index covers 122 
countries over the period 1960-2005 (Park, 2008). The index relates to patent rights only 
and not to overall IPR. It ranges from 0 to 5 and is the unweighted sum of five separate 
components: coverage (inventions that are patentable); membership in international 
treaties
9
; duration of protection; enforcement mechanisms; and restrictions (for example, 
compulsory licensing in the event that that a patented invention is not sufficiently 
exploited). 
                                                          
6
 The new data dissemination platform was launched in 2010 and is aimed to harmonize and integrate all 
UNCTAD’s statistical databases. UNCTADstat platform is chosen as a major source of data to minimize 
possible discrepancies in the data coming from separate sources.   
7 For the discussion of FDI data, see Section A.4 of the Appendix A. 
8
  See for example Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003), Hu and Png (2010), among many other studies.  
9 The GP index reflects the membership in Paris convention and revisions, Patent cooperation treaty (PCT), 
Protection of new varieties (UPOV), Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits), and Trade-related 
Intellectual property rights (TRIPS). 
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For the purpose of econometric analysis the GP index is the best available 
option.10 The index covers a large sample of countries over a long time period, so not 
only cross-country, but also within-country variation in IPR protection can be analyzed 
with the use of panel techniques. Also, the availability of five components of the GP 
index
11
 makes it possible to study the independent influence and relative importance of 
separate aspects of a given IPR regime. Given that the GP index is available at 5-year 
intervals for 122 countries over the period of 1960-2005, the sample of countries for the 
analysis is initially restricted by the availability of the GP index.  
Most other variables used in the analysis are available annually, so the choice 
between extrapolating the GP index versus averaging other variables has to be made. 
After a country amends its IPR laws (which is necessarily reflected in the 5-year GP 
score of a reforming country), it will certainly take some time to enforce these laws. So, 
extrapolating can potentially be a good idea if an enforcement function behaves 
monotonically between two consecutive periods. However, it is uncertain exactly how 
enforcement of IPR laws associates with the de jure laws, and this relation cannot be 
accurately measured. Also, because FDI inflows may fluctuate on a yearly basis, by 
averaging annual FDI over 5-year period a major trend in FDI can be traced. Thus, I 
decide to average FDI inflows and other explanatory variables, and work with the 5-year-
lagged sample of observations.  
                                                          
10
 For the discussion of other available IPR indexes, see Section A.4 of the Appendix A.  
11
 Thank you to Walter Park for providing the data on the components of the GP index.  
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Other covariates include Government Consumption, Schooling, Inflation, 
Openness, and Institutions.
12
 I use GDP in current prices and current exchange rates to 
normalize Openness (i.e., imports plus exports), Government Consumption, FDI and 
Domestic Investment, because these variables are available from UNCTADstat in current 
prices and current exchange rates. I first divide a given annual statistic by the same year 
GDP to get a ratio, so the relative importance of a certain covariate in overall economic 
activity of a country in a given year is measured. Then, I calculate 5-year average values 
of the resulting annual ratios to smooth out yearly fluctuations. If one or more of per 
annum observations are missing in a 5-year block of observations, the average is 
calculated for the available years. So, the value for a 5-year interval is missing in the final 
sample only if observations for every year in a 5-year block are missing. 
The measures of IPR, Schooling and log of Initial GDP capture the initial values 
for every 5-year interval. To calculate the log of Initial GDP I use the measure of GDP 
per capita, PPP adjusted, to account for the differences in countries’ development in 
every given period, so that the concept of convergence is captured by the panel 
regressions.  
Growth is measured by the change in the real GDP per capita. Three alternative 
measures of the GDP growth rates are used. The growth rate of GDP per capita measured 
in 1990 prices is from UNCTADstat and the other two growth rates, measured in 2005 
prices by two different methods (chain and Laspeyres), are from Penn World Tables 
(PWT) (Heston & Summers, 2009).  
                                                          
12
 Please see Section A.4 of the Appendix A for the discussion of all the covariates. 
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In order to unmask the role of total factor productivity (TFP) improvements 
versus capital accumulation in a country’s growth, the TFP growth rate is used as an 
alternative dependent variable with the same set of explanatory variables. The source of 
TFP data is Bosworth and Collins (2003). The original TFP dataset includes 84 countries 
over the period of 1960-2000. TFP is the residual,  , in the assumed production function 
of the form:      (  )   , where        ,   is the capital stock,   is the 
education measure, used to adjust the workforce,  , for the quality change.13 
 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
The final panel where the GDP growth rate is used as a dependent variable includes 103 
countries (1 to 8 observations per country) and the final TFP panel covers 79 countries (1 
to 7 observations per country).
14
 Table 2.1 shows that the 5-year average GDP growth 
rate ranges from negative 13% for Sierra Leone in 1995-1999
15
 to positive 11% for China 
in 2005-2009. There is also considerable variation in the 5-year average values of FDI as 
a share of GDP.
16
 For Gabon in 1995-99 FDI is negative 5% and for Congo in 2005-2009 
                                                          
13
 The capital stock,   is derived from a perpetual inventory model with a 0.05 rate of annual depreciation: 
                 . The education measure, H is an average of the estimates from Barro-Lee (2000) 
and Cohen-Soto (2001), and it incorporates a 7 percent rate of return to each year of education (see 
Bosworth and Collins, 2003 for further details). 
14 Luxembourg was dropped from both final samples due to the specificity of its FDI data (Luxembourg is 
a tax haven and Europe’s major financial center over the last several decades).  
15
 Negative growth rate is the reflection of 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone which began in 1991 when the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) intervened with an attempt to overthrow the Momoh government.  
16
 Since FDI is measured on a net basis (i.e., capital transactions' credits less debits between direct investors 
and their foreign affiliates), the FDI/GDP ratio is negative when FDI is negative due to equity capital, 
reinvested earnings or intra-company loans transactions being net negative. 
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FDI is positive 26%. The TFP growth rate ranges from negative 8% for Zimbabwe in 
2000-2004 to positive 14% for Sierra Leone in 2000-2004.
17
  
For the detailed properties of the distributions for the two variables of major 
interest, FDI and IPR, see Table 2.13 of the Appendix A. Also, Figures 1 and 2 show the 
dynamics in the world IPR protection. After the ratification of TRIPS agreement in 1994 
when the developing nations speed up the process of strengthening their IPR regimes, the 
growth of the mean value of the GP index accelerates while the variance declines.  
Table 2.14 of the Appendix A shows the GP index for the relevant countries. 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to estimate the growth effect of IPR, 
specifically to examine the role of FDI in determining the overall growth effect of IPR 
reform. Panel estimation makes it possible to control for time-invariant unobserved 
country specific effects, therefore eliminating a potential source of omitted variable bias 
peculiar to cross-country growth regressions.  
 
2.4.1. GDP growth, FDI and IPR 
The base model (1) examines the joint effect of the IPR regime and FDI inflows 
on growth. FDI is interacted with the measure of IPR protection and is used as a 
regressor. To ensure that the interaction term does not proxy for FDI or IPR, both of the 
latter variables are also included in the regression independently. Thus, the following 
specification is estimated: 
 
                                                          
17
 In 2002 the civil war in Sierra Leone was officially over. 
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(1)                                  (             )                   , 
 
where   represents each country and   represents each 5-year time period,         ; 
          is the 5-year average per annum growth rate of real GDP per capita for a 
country   in a period  ;        is a logarithm of the initial real GDP per capita, PPP 
adjusted, for country   in a period t;        is the 5-year average net FDI inflows as a 
share of GDP in the period  ;             include human capital measured as a 
percentage of secondary school enrollment in total population, government consumption 
as a share of GDP, market distortions, as proxied by the Fraser Institute’s Index of Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights, inflation, and the openness of a country, 
measured as a share of imports plus exports in GDP in period  . The error term,    , is a 
composite of unobserved country- and time-specific heterogeneity, and an idiosyncratic 
component,     , such that               . In order to hedge against the interacted 
model (1) spuriously capturing country-varying slopes, the country-specific means are 
subtracted from FDI and IPR in the interaction term (Ozer-Balli and Sorensen, 2010). 
  Table 2.2 presents the results of the model (1). As a preliminary exercise, I estimate 
the equation without the interaction term, so the direct growth effects of FDI and IPR are 
measured. In column (1), equation (1) is estimated without the interaction term and 
without fixed effects. In column (2) the same specification includes fixed effects, so 
unobserved heterogeneity between the countries as well as the existent time trends of 
explanatory variables are controlled for.  
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The coefficient of IPR is positive, significant, and robust to the inclusion of fixed 
effects or FDI.
18
 Given that the model controls for the overall quality of institutions, these 
preliminary results suggest that IPR protection is an independent source of growth. 19 
Also, in contrast to a number of cross-country growth studies which do not find an 
independent growth effect of FDI (Carkovic and Levine, 2002 among others), the 
preliminary results of Table 2.2 show that FDI positively relates to GDP growth. The 
magnitude and significance of the FDI coefficient do not depend on the inclusion of fixed 
effects or IPR in the model. I explain the significance of FDI in growth regressions of 
Table 2.2 by the new source of FDI data, bigger sample of countries and longer time 
period. Possible endogeneity of FDI, IPR and other variables as well as the robustness of 
this preliminary result are addressed shortly.  
Other specifications in Table 2.2 estimate the full model with the interaction of 
FDI and IPR included, because based on the discussed theoretical literature, the extent of 
attracted FDI likely influences the final outcome of IPR reform on a country’s 
production. The OLS specifications in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2 with the 
interaction of FDI and IPR included capture the nonmonotonic impact of IPR reform and 
the joint impact of IPR and attracted FDI on the domestic economy is estimated.  
                                                          
18 
The significance and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on FDI (IPR) do not depend on the 
inclusion of IPR (FDI) into the regression, or the inclusion of fixed effects.  
19
  Also, in Table 8 of the Appendix A I include all five components of the GP index in the regression 
independently. Only Membership component stays significant, suggesting that it likely drives the results of 
Table 2. Indeed, Membership in international IP treaties sets the minimum standards on duration of 
protection, industries covered by the IPR laws and other important aspects of the IPR regime. While the 
Membership component seems to convey the major part of information contained in the GP index, the other 
four components are essential to reflect additional variation in countries’ IPR regimes. 
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The primary interest lies in the sign of   . If    is positive and significant, then a 
stronger IPR regime augments the positive growth effect of FDI (i.e., an increase in 
foreign activity outweighs a decrease in imitative activity). If    is negatively significant, 
stronger IPR protection mitigates the growth effect of attracted FDI (i.e., a decrease in 
imitative activity outweighs an increase in foreign activity). Columns (3) and (4) of  
Table 2.2 report the OLS estimates for equation (1). The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term,   , is negative and significant in both OLS specifications, suggesting 
that while separately FDI and IPR positively relate to GDP growth, they also have 
offsetting growth effects.  
  The signs and the magnitude of other coefficients are consistent with the growth 
literature. In particular, countries with relatively low levels of initial GDP per capita grow 
faster, suggesting convergence of living standards across the world. Property rights’ 
protection is essential for growth, which is also higher if an economy actively participates 
in international trade. However, big government is detrimental to growth, as well as high 
inflation. Also, human capital promotes growth, which is shown in columns (1) and (3). 
When fixed effects are included in columns (2) and (4), they pick up the impact of 
Schooling and it becomes insignificant, pointing at a slow pace of human capital 
accumulation for any particular country. These results are robust to different measures of 
growth, initial GDP, and openness.  
However, the fixed-effects OLS regressions can produce inconsistent estimates 
because: (i) causality may run in either direction for FDI, IPR or other variables (i.e., 
endogeneity may be an issue); (ii) the lagged dependent variable gives rise to 
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autocorrelation; (iii) panel dataset has a short time dimension and a large country 
dimension. To cope with these problems and obtain consistent parameter estimates, I 
estimate the interacted model (1) using the Arellano-Bond (AB) GMM technique.
20
 The 
GMM results are presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.2.  
I choose to treat the log of Initial GDP, Institutions, FDI, IPR and the interaction 
term as endogenous. FDI may be endogenous to growth if a growing economy attracts 
additional FDI because MNEs are lured by high profit opportunities. IPR can be 
endogenous to growth if a country adopts stronger IPR protection because grown-up 
domestic industries accumulated their own IP and lobby to protect it.  
  In column (5) I use the “Difference” GMM estimator and instrument endogenous 
variables with their lags up to the 3
rd
 period. The crucial assumptions for the validity of 
GMM estimators are (i) error terms are correlated only within individuals, not across 
them; (ii) the instruments are exogenous. Both assumptions are tested and the results of 
the tests are shown at the bottom of Table 2.2. The AB test shows no serial correlation. 
The AB test says that AR (2) coefficient is informative because first order autocorrelation 
is generated by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the regression (p-value for 
AR (2) is reported in the bottom of the Table 2.2). The Hansen J test fails to reject that 
the instruments as a group are exogenous. Also, Difference-in-Hansen statistics (not 
                                                          
20 
For the technical summary of the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM estimators see Section A.3 of the 
Appendix A. Note that many empirical papers apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach instead of AB 
GMM technique to deal with endogenous variables, often using the same instruments for different 
variables. However, as pointed out in Bazzi and Clemens (2009), an instrument that is plausibly valid in 
one setting can be shown invalid when used in another setting. Because of a lack of original instruments for 
FDI or IPR and a reason why some of the popular cross-country instruments are valid in my regressions 
only, I choose to use the AB GMM estimator instead of the IV technique.  
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reported) show that all five separate groups of instruments for five endogenous variables 
are exogenous. 
The “System” GMM requires an additional assumption of no correlation between 
the differences of instrumental variables and country-specific effects. However, the 
validity of this assumption may be questioned. For instance, if the amplitude of 
fluctuations of FDI inflows are related to the off-shore status of a country (i.e., time-
invariant country-specific effect), and such fluctuations depend on the economic climate 
in the countries where FDI originates, then the assumption of no correlation between the 
differences of variables (difference in FDI in this case) and country-specific effects might 
be violated. Nevertheless, I report the results of the regression (2), estimated with the 
“System” GMM in column (6) of Table 2.2. In the next tables I prefer to use the 
“Difference” GMM because (i) the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are exogenous in my sample; (ii) to keep the number of instruments less than 
the number of countries; (iii) the validity of an extra assumption for the “System” GMM 
is questionable. 
As shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.2, both GMM estimators as well as 
pooled OLS and fixed-effects OLS produce similar qualitative results, suggesting that 
possible endogeneity of FDI or IPR do not drive the results of the OLS regressions. 
However, since the magnitude of the estimated FDI coefficient fluctuates depending on 
the method used, endogeneity of FDI is likely present, so I prefer the results of the 
“Difference” GMM estimation. 
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The results of the “Difference” GMM estimation, in Column (5) of Table 2.2, 
suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in a country’s ratio of FDI to GDP leads to 
approximately 3 percentage point increase in growth. The estimates also say that a one 
standard deviation increase in the IPR would increase the growth rate by 1 percentage 
point. However, FDI and IPR have offsetting effects on growth.  
A graph of the coefficient estimates in the three-space of growth, IPR, and FDI is 
shown in Figure 3. This figure is constructed for the full sample using the “Difference” 
GMM estimates from column (1) of Table 2.10 of the Appendix A, where in the 
regressions the variables in the interaction term are not demeaned. In column (2), 
observations that might be considered outliers are excluded from the sample as a 
sensitivity check (i.e., the 99
th
 percentile of FDI distribution is dropped). The estimates 
from column (2) produce a nearly identical picture.  
Figure 3 shows that there appears to be ranges over which IPR has both positive 
and negative effects on growth. This stands out plainly in the U-shape of growth relative 
to IPR shown in the graph. It can be seen how the slope with respect to one variable 
changes while moving across the contour in the direction of the other variable. Notice 
that for both IPR and FDI, the slope diminishes as the other variable increases. The same 
idea is captured by the estimates in Table 2.2, where IPR and FDI show positive, but 
offsetting growth effects.  
As a robustness check for the results of Table 2.2, in Table 2.9 of the Appendix A, 
I estimate the regression (1) with the errors clustered by country. If the observations for a 
country are correlated in an unknown way, inducing correlation of standard errors, OLS 
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estimates are still unbiased, but standard errors might be miscalculated, causing incorrect 
inferences. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.9 in the Appendix A report the results of OLS 





2.4.2. Factor accumulation versus total factor productivity 
In Table 2.3 to see whether the positive, but offsetting growth effects of FDI and 
IPR work through accumulation of capital or through improvements in total factor 
productivity (TFP), the TFP growth rate is used instead of GDP growth rate with the 
same set of explanatory variables.  
The significance of the FDI coefficient in the regressions of Table 2.3 suggests 
that FDI contributes to TFP development directly. Foreign technology, know-how and 
business models embedded in FDI improve productivity of domestic firms (as shown by 
the TFP growth regressions in Table 2.3). Improved productivity contributes to the 
increase in domestic production together with the direct capital accumulation via FDI (as 
shown by the GDP growth regressions in Table 2.2). 
                                                          
21 All the regressions in Table 2 were also repeated for: growth rate of real GDP per capita in 2005 prices, 
constructed by chain method, and for the growth rate of real GDP per capita in 2005 prices, constructed by 
Laspeyres method. Also, as an alternative measure of openness, the Fraser Institute’s index of Freedom to 
Trade Internationally, was used. The same qualitative results were produced. When schooling is measured 
as average years of schooling in total population, the variable is always insignificant. When FDI is 
measured as a stock as a share of GDP, it is insignificant. Finally, all the regressions were repeated for the 
average values of FDI, government consumption as a share of GDP, and exports plus imports as a share of 
GDP, constructed as the ratios of averages, not as the averages of ratios as in the original set of regressions. 




While IPR is not significant by itself at conditional levels, the F-test of joint 
significance of FDI, IPR and their interaction (not reported) strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that the three variables together are not significant. As suggested by the 
endogenous growth models by Helpman (1993), Lai (1998) and others, and as discussed 
in the previous section, the extent of FDI likely influences the total effect of IPR reform 
on domestic production.  So, as the theory says and as it is supported by the F-test of joint 
significance, all three variables should be included in the regression.        
Finally, the central result of Table 2.2 that the interaction of IPR and FDI is 
negative significant also holds in the TFP growth regressions of Table 2.3. It means that 
the mitigating effect of IPR on the growth effect of FDI works through the TFP channel, 
i.e., a stronger IPR regime limits the adoption by domestic firms of new technologies 
brought via FDI. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.9 of the Appendix A report the estimates 
of TFP regressions calculated with standard errors clustered by country. The results of 
Table 2.3 are unchanged. 
 
2.5. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section various robustness checks are performed to challenge the major 
result of the previous section that the interaction of FDI and IPR is negatively significant. 
First, I look at FDI versus Domestic Investment. Next, I consider Finance instead of IPR. 
Finally, I address a common critique of the GP index that it does not include enforcement 
measures. Further robustness checks are presented in the Appendix A.  
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2.5.1. Domestic investment versus FDI 
While the results of TFP growth regressions point at FDI as the channel through 
which the mitigating IPR effect on growth works, it can still be argued that FDI simply 
captures the effect of total domestic investment, which is not included as a regressor in 
the previous tables. To address this concern, in Table 2.4 I show the regressions with the 
overall domestic investment included. Also, I include the interaction of Domestic 
Investment and IPR to see whether the negative interaction effect, shown in the previous 
tables, works for a broader category of investment (i.e., total domestic investment 
including FDI).  
The estimates of Table 2.4 suggest that while domestic investment contributes to 
GDP growth, FDI (often being a small portion of total domestic investment) has an 
independent growth impact. The significance of FDI in the regression with overall 
domestic investment included is likely explained by the qualitative differences (i.e., 
richer human capital and/or technological content) of FDI over other categories of 
domestic investment. Also, because the interaction of Domestic investment and IPR is 
not significant, stronger IPR protection seems to diminish the growth effect of foreign 
investment only, but not of other investment categories, suggesting that among other 







2.5.2. Finance versus IPR 
Table 2.5 addresses another concern which arises because of the results found in 
Alfaro et al. (2004, 2009). The authors include a finance variable
22
 as well as the 
interaction of FDI and Finance in cross-country GDP and TFP growth regressions (one 
observation per country). They find that the interaction of FDI and Finance is positively 
significant and robust to various sensitivity checks, while FDI independently is not 
significant. The authors’ main conclusion is that developed financial markets are crucial 
for the beneficial effects of FDI to be realized.  
It is possible that by not including Finance in growth regressions, IPR picks up 
the positive growth effect of Finance (especially given that the correlation between IPR 
and Finance in my sample is 0.48). Moreover, it may be that the negative significant 
interaction of FDI and IPR is the result of a misspecified model that should include the 
interaction of Finance and FDI. These concerns are addressed in Table 2.5. The growth 
regressions of Table 2.5 show that neither Finance nor the interaction of Finance and FDI 
are significant, while IPR and its interaction with FDI are significant and robust to the 
inclusion of additional Finance terms.  
My results contrast with those by Alfaro et al. (2004, 2009), who find that the 
joint effect of Finance and FDI is positive. Note that in the studies by Alfaro et al. (2004, 
2009) the analysis of the joint effect of Finance and FDI on growth is based on cross-
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 Finance is measured by (i) credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of GDP; (ii) 
ratio of commercial bank domestic assets divided by central bank plus commercial bank assets; (iii) liquid 
liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of the financial 
intermediaries and non-bank financial intermediaries); (iv) the value of credits by financial intermediaries 
to the private sector divided by GDP.  
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country regressions with one observation per country, but my analysis is conducted in a 
panel setting. My results are consistent with Carkovic and Levine (2002) in terms of the 
interaction of Finance and FDI, but unlike all these authors I find a significant effect of 
FDI on its own. Moreover, my results are robust to specification questions raised by 
Carkovic and Levine (2002), concerning the Alfaro et al. (2004) model. For further 
analysis of the joint effect of Finance and FDI on growth in a cross-sectional setting, see 
Section A.5 and Table 2.7 of the Appendix A.   
 
2.5.3. IPR enforcement  
A common critique of the GP Index is that it does not include enforcement 
measures. In Table 2.6, I interact the GP index with the Fraser Institute’s Index of Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights, in the same manner as in Hu and Png (2010).
23
 
The Fraser Institute’s Index measures the quality of institutions. By interacting the GP 
index of patent protection with the measure of overall institutional quality, I account for 
the enforcement of IPR laws. This assumes that the extent of IPR laws’ enforcement 
approximately follows that of overall law enforcement.
24
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 The authors use two different methods to change the GP index, so it reflects de facto patent laws: (i) the 
product of the GP index and the measure of the overall laws’ enforcement, proxied by the Fraser Institute’s 
index of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, and (ii) the weighted average of the GP index and 
the Fraser index. 
24 
The validity of this assumption can certainly be questioned. The best example is probably China, where 
currently the IPR laws are poorly enforced, while other laws’ enforcement is strong. Whether interacting 
the GP index with the measure of the quality of institutions introduces more noise to the IPR measure or 
makes the GP index a better measure of the de facto differences in the IPR regimes, is hard to say. So, as a 
robustness check of the results in the previous tables, I show the regressions where the GP index is 
interacted with the measure of the quality of institutions to account for the enforcement of IPR laws.   
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If a country has a strict IPR policy, but zero enforcement of the laws in practice, 
the interacted index will reflect the absence of de facto IPR laws working in a country. 
Thus, the interaction of FDI, IPR (measured by the GP Index), and the enforcement 
measure (proxied by the Fraser index) are included in the regression together with all the 
cross-products of its components, as well as all the components independently.  
In the previous tables I found that FDI and IPR have positive, but offsetting 
growth effects. Table 2.6 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of new terms 
with the Institutions variable. In addition, the regressions of Table 2.6 show that the 
enforced IPR laws augment the positive growth effect of de jure laws (the coefficient on 
the interaction of IPR and Institutions is positively significant in both OLS regressions). 
Also, it was previously found by Coe et al. (2009) that countries with relatively high 
institutional quality benefit more from R&D spillovers. In Column (3) of Table 2.6, the 
interaction of FDI and Institutions is positive and significant, which means that 
Institutions also enhance a country’s ability to benefit from FDI. Although the triple 
interaction is insignificant
25
, it is negative in two out of three regressions and the effect 
gets more pronounced when endogeneity is controlled for in GMM regression. While it is 
harder to capture any effect when additional interactions are included, the triple 
interaction of FDI, IPR and Institutions in GMM regressions is negative, and if 
interpreted literally, suggests that the mediating effect of IPR gets bigger with stricter law 
enforcement.  
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The theory argues that by strengthening IPR protection, dynamic efficiency (i.e., 
flows of innovation and international technology transfer) can be enhanced. However, 
strengthening IPR necessarily reduces static efficiency because it raises the marginal cost 
of knowledge diffusion into the public domain. This paper empirically investigates this 
paradox of the offsetting effects from strengthening the IPR regime by looking at the 
relation between FDI and growth. The paper finds that a 10 percentage point increase in a 
country’s ratio of FDI to GDP leads to an approximately 3 percentage point increase in 
growth and that a one standard deviation increase in IPR is associated with a 1 percentage 
point increase in growth. However, FDI and IPR have offsetting impacts on growth, and 
at the highest levels of FDI, it appears that more lax IPR can in fact increase the growth 
rate. While more work needs to be done, these estimates extend our understanding of the 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
     




Sample 1: 103 countries ( 652 observations, 1970-2009 ) 
     
GDP Growth 0.02 0.03 -0.13 0.11 
FDI 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.26 
Schooling  0.33 0.18 0.02 0.88 
Government Consumption  0.16 0.05 0.04 0.41 
Inflation 0.48 3.50 -0.06 69.63 
Openness 0.71 0.51 0.09 4.29 
Institutions 5.64 2.18 1.19 9.89 
Domestic Investment 0.23 0.07 0.004 0.56 
IPR  2.55 1.09 0 4.88 
     
Sample 2: 79 countries ( 458 observations, 1970-2000 ) 
     
TFP Growth 0.004 0.02 -0.08 0.14 
FDI 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.16 
Schooling  0.31 0.16 0.02 0.69 
Government Consumption  0.16 0.05 0.04 0.41 
Inflation 0.47 2.62 -0.06 38.59 
Openness 0.63 0.46 0.09 3.87 
Institutions 5.73 2.33 1.19 9.89 
Domestic Investment 0.23 0.07 0.004 0.56 
IPR 2.40 1.07 0.13 4.88 
     
 
Notes: GDP Growth is the growth rate of real GDP per capita measured in 1990 prices. TFP Growth is the 
growth rate of total factor productivity, measured as a the residual,  , in the assumed production function: 
     (  )   , where    0.35. Sample 1 refers to the countries used in the regressions where the GDP 
growth rate is the dependent variable, while sample 2 refers to the countries used in the regressions where 
TFP growth rate is the dependent variable. For the list of countries see Section A.1 of the Appendix A. FDI 
is measured as a share in GDP. Schooling is measured as the percentage of secondary school enrollment in 
total population. Government consumption is measured as a share in GDP. Inflation is measured as a 
percentage change in GDP deflator. Openness is measured as imports plus exports as a share in GDP. IPR 
is measured by the GP index of patent protection. The quality of institutions is measured by the Fraser 
Institute’s index of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. The growth rate, FDI, government 
consumption, inflation, and openness are averages over 5-year intervals; if one or more of yearly 
observations are missing in a 5-year block of observations, the average is calculated for the available years; 
thus, the final value for the 5-year interval is missing only if observations for every year in a 5-year block 
are missing. Fraser Institute’s index is available every 5 years starting in 1970, and annually starting 2000; 
thus, for the years 1970-1999 the index is given by the initial values for every 5-year interval and starting in 
2000 the index is averaged over 5-year intervals. IPR, Schooling and log (Initial GDP) capture the initial 




Table 2.2: GDP growth, FDI, and IPR 
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




       
FDI 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.30 0.18 
 (2.78) (1.91) (2.98) (3.26) (2.39) (2.33) 
IPR 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.34) (3.04) (2.41) (3.32) (4.31) (3.23) 
FDI*IPR - - -0.09 -0.16 -0.24 -0.15 
 - - (-1.71) (-2.64) (-2.54) (-2.14) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-6.28) (-7.68) (-6.29) (-7.41) (-4.40) (-4.05) 
Schooling 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (2.17) (-0.95) (2.07) (-0.91) (0.54) (1.05) 
Government Consumption -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 
 (-2.95) (-1.81) (-2.82) (-1.77) (-1.95) (-2.38) 
Institutions 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (5.95) (3.44) (5.94) (3.50) (2.61) (3.14) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-13.16) (-5.97) (-12.81) (-5.78) (-3.52) (-8.53) 
Openness 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (2.50) (2.80) (2.12) (2.36) (1.18) (2.11) 
African Dummy -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 - -0.02 
 (-5.86) (0.27) (-5.89) (0.40) - (-2.79) 
       
R2 0.24 0.56 0.25 0.57   
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes   
Year       fixed effects No Yes No Yes   
       
Hansen test (p-level)     0.11 0.28 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level)     0.51 0.33 
Number of instruments     79 102 
Observations 652 652 652 652 549 652 
       
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 103 
countries. For the list of countries and the detailed definitions of the variables see the Appendix A and the 
notes to Table 2.1. The country-specific means are subtracted from IPR and FDI variables before 
constructing the FDI*IPR interaction term. In GMM regressions log (Initial GDP), FDI, IPR, Institutions 
and the FDI*IPR interaction term are treated as endogenous with the lags up to the 4
th
 period used as the 
instruments for all the endogenous variables, except for the log (Initial GDP) and Institutions variables in 
the “System” GMM regression, which are instrumented with the lags up to the 3
rd
 period to keep the total 
number of instruments less than or equal to the number of countries in the sample; two-step estimation is 
implemented with Windmeijer’s finite sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. The results are 





Table 2.3: TFP Growth, FDI and IPR 
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual TFP growth rate 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS-FE OLS OLS-FE GMM 
(difference) 
      
FDI 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.31 
 (4.45) (3.26) (4.86) (3.67) (3.19) 
IPR 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.58) (-0.93) (0.81) (-0.38) (1.24) 
FDI*IPR - - -0.18 -0.22 -0.46 
 - - (-2.17) (-2.50) (-2.94) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-4.80) (-3.54) (-4.91) (-3.39) (-2.35) 
Schooling 0.002 -0.02 0.001 -0.02 -0.001 
 (0.18) (-1.22) (0.09) (-1.23) (-0.06) 
Government Consumption -0.02 0.004 -0.01 0.002 -0.04 
 (-0.83) (0.08) (-0.62) (0.03) (-0.79) 
Institutions 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 
 (5.96) (1.28) (5.89) (1.11) (2.13) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (-3.25) (-2.30) (-2.99) (-2.27) (-0.96) 
Openness -0.004 0.03 -0.003 0.03 0.02 
 (-1.62) (3.44) (-1.42) (3.35) (1.66) 
African Dummy -0.003 0.02 -0.004 0.02 - 
 (-0.66) (0.65) (-0.86) (0.73) - 
      
R
2
 0.15 0.45 0.16 0.45  
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes  
Year       fixed effects No Yes No Yes  
      
Hansen test (p-level)     0.27 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level)     0.29 
Number of instruments     65 
Observations 458 458 458 458 379 
      
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 79 
countries. For the list of countries and the detailed definitions of the variables see the Appendix A and the 
notes to Table 2.1. The country-specific means are subtracted from FDI and IPR variables before 
constructing the FDI*IPR interaction term. In GMM regressions log (Initial GDP), FDI, IPR, Institutions 
and the FDI*IPR interaction term are treated as endogenous with the lags up to the 4
th
 period used as the 
instruments; two-step estimation is implemented with Windmeijer’s finite sample correction for the two-
step covariance matrix. The results are reported for the forward-orthogonal transform, with similar 





Table 2.4: Robustness checks: Domestic investment versus FDI 
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS-FE OLS OLS-FE OLS-FE GMM 
(difference) 
       
FDI 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.16 
 (3.43) (2.68) (2.69) (1.62) (2.59) (1.41) 
IPR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (3.62) (3.64) (3.55) (3.36) (3.58) (5.62) 
FDI*IPR -0.11 -0.14 - - -0.13 -0.18 
 (-2.29) (2.35) - - (-2.14) (-2.22) 
Domestic Investment 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.05 
 (7.91) (6.72) (7.87) (6.76) (6.62) (1.12) 
Domestic Investment*IPR - - 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
 - - (0.36) (-1.20) (-0.78) (-0.18) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
 (-6.16) (-7.40) (-6.06) (-7.65) (-7.42) (-3.94) 
Schooling 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.001 
 (2.02) (-0.93) (2.12) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-0.02) 
Government Consumption -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 
 (-3.48) (-1.72) (-3.64) (-1.63) (-1.64) (-3.14) 
Institutions 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.01 
 (4.80) (2.55) (4.85) (2.58) (2.61) (2.76) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-8.35) (-5.36) (-8.77) (-5.64) (-5.46) (-3.63) 
Openness 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.22) (1.63) (0.71) (1.87) (1.54) (1.03) 
African Dummy -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 - 
 (-4.04) (1.40) (-3.98) (1.34) (1.39) - 
       
R
2
 0.34 0.61 0.34 0.61 0.61  
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes  
Year       fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes  
       
Hansen test (p-level)      0.21 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level)      0.49 
Number of instruments      81 
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 549 
       
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 103 
countries. Domestic investment is measured as gross capital formation as a share of GDP. For the list of 
countries and the detailed definitions of the variables see the Appendix A and the notes to Table 2.1. The 
country-specific means are subtracted from FDI, IPR and Domestic Investment variables before 
constructing the interaction terms. In GMM regression log (Initial GDP), FDI, IPR, Institutions, Domestic 
Investment, and the interaction terms are treated as endogenous with the lags up to the 3
rd
 period used as 
the instruments; two-step estimation is implemented with Windmeijer’s finite sample correction for the 
two-step covariance matrix. The results are reported for the forward-orthogonal transform, with similar 
qualitative results for the first-differencing transform.  
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Table 2.5: Robustness checks: Financial market development versus IPR 
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual GDP growth rate 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE GMM 
(difference) 
     
FDI 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.34 
 (3.73) (3.31) (3.75) (2.42) 
IPR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.38) (2.01) (2.30) (3.47) 
FDI*IPR -0.16 - -0.15 -0.21 
 (-2.51) - (-2.20) (-2.51) 
Finance -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-1.57) (-1.24) (-1.42) (-0.19) 
FDI*Finance - -0.12 -0.08 -0.21 
 - (-1.87) (-1.29) (-1.25) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-7.54) (-7.77) (-7.58) (-4.30) 
Schooling 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.66) 
Government Consumption -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 
 (-2.61) (-2.24) (-2.38) (-2.18) 
Institutions 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.01 
 (3.22) (3.08) (3.14) (3.09) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.56) (-1.71) (-1.53) (-1.04) 
Openness 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (2.39) (2.67) (2.35) (1.52) 
African Dummy -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 - 
 (-8.04) (-7.31) (-7.65) - 
     
R2 0.56 0.55 0.56  
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
Year       fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
     
Hansen  test (p-level)    0.17 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level)    0.60 
Number of instruments    82 
Observations 596 596 596 497 
     
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 99 
countries (data on Financial Market development are not available for China, Nicaragua, Ukraine, and 
Zimbabwe, which are present in the full GDP sample with 103 countries). For the list of countries and the 
detailed definitions of the variables see the Appendix A and the notes to Table 2.1. The country-specific 
means are subtracted from all the variables in all the interaction terms. In GMM regression log (Initial 
GDP), FDI, IPR, Institutions, Financial Market, and the interaction terms are treated as endogenous with 
the lags up to the 3
rd
 period used as the instruments; two-step estimation is implemented with Windmeijer’s 
finite sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. The results are reported for the forward-




Table 2.6: Robustness checks: IPR enforcement 
Dependent variable - 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS-FE GMM 
(Difference) 
 
FDI 0.17 0.21 0.35 
 (3.20) (3.22) (2.95) 
IPR 0.003 0.01 0.01 
 (2.21) (3.11) (3.91) 
FDI*IPR -0.11 -0.17 -0.25 
 (-1.97) (-2.62) (-2.75) 
IPR*Institutions 0.003 0.003 -0.002 
 (2.33) (1.92) (-0.84) 
FDI*Institutions -0.06 -0.05 0.19 
 (-0.80) (-0.75) (2.24) 
FDI*IPR*Institutions 0.001 -0.02 -0.10 
 (0.03) (-0.39) (-1.40) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-6.14) (-7.51) (-4.64) 
Schooling 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
 (2.09) (-0.88) (-4.64) 
Government Consumption -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 
 (-2.71) (-1.76) (-2.05) 
Institutions 0.004 0.004 0.01 
 (5.70) (3.24) (2.80) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-12.62) (-5.68) (-3.75) 
Openness 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (2.08) (2.46) (1.10) 
African Dummy -0.02 0.01 - 
 (-5.72) (0.34) - 
    
R2 0.25 0.57  
Country fixed effects No Yes  
Year       fixed effects No Yes  
    
Hansen test (p-level)   0.23 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level)   0.31 
Number of instruments   96 
Observations 652 652 549 
    
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 103 
countries. The country-specific means are subtracted from all the variables in all the interaction terms. In 
GMM regression log (Initial GDP), FDI, IPR, Institutions, and all the interaction terms are treated as 
endogenous with the lags up to the 3
rd
 period used as the instruments. The results are reported for the 
forward-orthogonal transform. 
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Political limits on the World Oil Trade: Firm-level 
Evidence from US firms 
 
3.1. Introduction  
There is evidence that international politics affects trade patterns, especially for 
firms in extractive industries. In recent studies Mityakov et al. (2011, 2012) use 
disaggregated import flows at a sectoral level into the United States and find that the US 
imports significantly less crude oil from its political opponents, even after controlling for 
wars, sanctions, and tariffs.
26
 Given that the crude oil trade is often associated with 
backward vertical FDI, oil-firms face hold-up and expropriation risks, which likely rise 
when the political relationship between the US and its trading partner worsens, thus 
affecting the final oil imports. At the same time oil is a strategic commodity, imports of 
which are not only driven by profit-maximizing motives, but also by strategic and 
security consideration of the governments.  The authors confirm that both economic and 
political forces explain the finding that the US imports less oil from its political 
opponents.   
                                                          
26
 Mityakov et al. (2012) find that among 10 aggregate categories of US imports, - namely: petroleum, raw 
materials, forest products, tropical agriculture, animal products, cereals, etc., labor intensive, capital 
intensive, machinery, and chemicals, - only crude oil and some chemical products are affected by 
international politics.  
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In this paper I use firm-level oil imports by the companies that operated in the US 
during the period 1986-2010 to further test if: (i) US firms import significantly less oil 
from the political opponents of the US government; (ii) large, vertically integrated US oil 
firms are the most sensitive to changes in political relationships between the US 
government and oil exporting states; (iii) the effect is more pronounced for the subsample 
of countries that have a history of nationalizations in the oil sector; and (iv) the effect is 
more pronounced during the cold war period and the period after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. To measure the degree of political misalignment between the US and oil 
exporting countries I use the voting records from the United Nations General Assembly, 
similarly to Dreher and Strum (2012). 
I confirm the finding of Mityakov et al. (2011, 2012) that US firms import 
significantly less oil from the political opponents of the United States. In the preferred 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) specification with fixed effects and oil 
reserves as a control variable I find that a one standard deviation reduction in political 
distance increases US oil imports by more than 13 percent. I also find that the negative 
effect of political distance on oil imports by US firms is more pronounced for the cold-
war period and the period post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, suggesting that US oil-firms 
diversified their sources of oil supply away from the political opponents of the US most 
actively during these two periods.  
Without data on foreign direct investment (FDI) for the US companies in our 
sample I opt for another approach to test the hold-up risk hypothesis proposed by 
Mityakov et al. (2012). In particular, I divide the US firms in our sample by their size, 
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assuming that large firms in the sample engage more often in FDI than small firms. I use 
two different methods to divide the firms in our sample: (i) based on the mean value of 
firms’ annual imports in the 1986-2012 period, and (ii) based on the mean value of firms’ 
total oil imports throughout the whole period. Our results suggest that the large firms in 
our sample appear to drive the baseline finding that US firms import less from the 
countries politically more distant from the US. The negative effect of political distance on 
oil imports by US firms is larger and more significant for the subsample of large firms, 
identified either way, while this effect is not observable for the subsample of small firms.  
This relationship determines potential economic costs of hold-up.  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data,  
section 3.3 presents the results of our analysis, and section 3.4 offers concluding remarks.  
 
3.2. Data 
I use the following sources of data for our analysis. Firm-level oil imports by 
companies that operate in the US are sourced from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). The EIA original dataset is a monthly time-series for the period of 
1986-2010, and it includes information on firms’ imports of petroleum and other liquids 
in thousands of barrels. I use monthly EIA data to construct annual time-series of crude 
oil imports, and I use this in panel regressions as a dependent variable with control 
variables which also have annual frequency.  
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Data on the Political Distance between the US and oil exporting countries in our 
dataset are sourced from Dreher and Strum (2012). The authors have used voting data 
from the United Nations General Assembly to construct several indexes which measure 
the degree of political alignment between different states. These indexes vary in the way 
in which they weight abstentions and absences in the voting procedures - in particular, 
the weights can be 0, 0.5 or 1. I follow the logic of Dreher and Strum (2012) in not 
choosing the corner solutions and favor the index constructed according to the definition 
by Thacker (1999), where the votes in agreement with the United States are coded as 1, 
votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions and absences as 0.5. The index lies between 0 
and 1, where a higher value reflects closer political interests of the US and the other 
country. In our regressions I use a political distance variable which equals 1 minus the 
original index, such that a higher value for the variable represents more politically distant 
governments.  
I also use annual oil reserves and oil production data for the period 1980-2011 
from the EIA as control variables in our regressions. Crude oil proven reserves are 
measured in billions of barrels, and production of crude oil including lease condensate is 
measured in thousands of barrels per day. While our preferred control variable is oil 
reserves as it is less subject to the endogeneity problem than the oil production variable, 
as a robustness check I use oil production as well. I also use such traditional controls for a 
gravity model as GDP and population, taken from the Penn World Tables, version 7.0.  
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
regressions. The base dataset has 6,322 observations and includes oil imports by US 
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firms from 59 oil-exporting countries. During 1986-2010, there are 156 oil-importing 
firms operating in the US with on average 60 firms co-existing within the same year. For 
the list of oil exporting countries in our sample please see Section I of the Appendix B.
27
   
The variation in the quantity of oil imports is significant: the maximum annual oil 
import quantity is 197,479 thousand barrels, imported by “Motiva Enterprises LLC”
28
 
from Saudi Arabia in 2001, while at the same time there are about 20 zero observations in 
our baseline dataset. Political distance also has substantial variation and ranges from 
0.420 between the US and Australia in 2005 to 0.956 between the US and Algeria in 
2007.  
 
3.3. Empirical analysis 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test if (i) US firms import significantly 
less oil from the political opponents of the United States; (ii) large, vertically integrated 
US oil firms are the most sensitive to changes in political relationships between the US 
and oil exporting states; (iii) the effect is more pronounced for the subsample of countries 
that have a history of nationalizations in the oil sector; (iv) the effect is more pronounced 
during the cold war period as well as the period after the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
 I do not have data on the life spans of the US companies in our dataset and this 
information is important if I want to properly account for years with zero oil imports for 
                                                          
27 The G7 countries are not included in our final dataset because the data on political distance do not cover 
the G7 countries.  
28
 “Motiva Enterprises, LLC”, is a 50–50 joint venture between “Shell Oil Company” (the wholly owned 
American subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) and “Saudi Refining” (controlled by Saudi Aramco). Formed in 
1998, Motiva Enterprises LLC operates primarily in the eastern and southern United States. For more 
information see http://www.motivaenterprises.com. 
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the firms that exist but choose not to import, or import only in certain years from chosen 
countries. Instead, I construct three additional datasets using different assumptions about 
the life spans of the firms in our baseline dataset. While no dataset by itself resolves the 
data limitation issue that I have, their joint analysis makes it possible to have robust 
findings that do not depend on a particular assumption about the life spans of the firms. 
I add zeros to our baseline Dataset-1 with 6,322 observations using the following 
imputation schemes. First, I assume that all the firms in our sample exist during the 
whole period of 1986-2010 and choose not to import in years before or after the firm’s 
actual existence. Therefore, I add zero observations to all the firm-countries-years not 
originally present in the baseline Dataset-1. This procedure produces Dataset-2 with 
270,504 observations. I then change zeros into missing values for the years before the US 
firms in our sample imported for the first time. This procedure imputes that the firms did 
not exist before making their first imports and it reduces the number of observations to 
186,949 in our Dataset-3. Finally, to construct Dataset-4, I also change zeros into missing 
values after firms imported for the last time within the period 1986-2010. This implies 
that the lifetime of a firm starts with its first import and ends with its last import. This 
step further reduces the number of observations to 105,994.  
I adopt the standard gravity model for trade to test our hypotheses. In a standard 
model (2), the value of oil imports from country   to the US in year  , denoted by    
   is 
inversely proportional to     , the distance between the US and the other country, and 
proportional to the product of the two countries’ GDPs, denoted by      and   
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      (    )
  (    )
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where  ,  ,   and   are unknown parameters, and     
   is an error term. Provided    
   is 
strictly positive, I can log-linearize the above equation to obtain the standard gravity 
equation:  
 
(3)        
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where instead of      which typically measures geographic distance as well as cultural 
distance, I include the one year lag of political distance between the US and country  . 
Our coefficient of interest is   and it measures the impact of political distance on the log 
of the value of oil imports by US firms.  Following the conventions from literature on 
trade, other control variables are measured in year  . In our baseline specification I 
control for oil reserves and population.
29
 I also include year fixed effects to capture time-
specific characteristics (e.g., global oil price, US GDP and political distance to the rest of 
the world), and oil exporter fixed effects to capture time-invariant characteristics (e.g., 
geographical distance and cultural distance to the US).   
 Given that equation (3) can only be used to estimate regressions with strictly 
positive no-zero oil imports, I also use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
estimator (PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to estimate equation 
(3), thus zero oil imports can also be included in the analysis. While the PPML estimates 
                                                          
29
 As a robustness check I also tried to control for oil production instead of oil reserves.  
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are consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, if certain oil imports are 
incorrectly reported as zeros, the PPML estimates may be biased. Thus, I report both 
OLS and PPML estimates.  
 
3.3.1. Political distance and US oil imports: panel analysis with fixed effects 
Table 3.2 presents our basic results. In the first two columns I report the estimates 
of simple fixed effects OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
oil imports by US firms in our sample. In column (1) the regressions include exporter’s 
fixed effects and in column (2) year fixed effects are included as well. When both fixed 
effects are included the estimate of the political distance coefficient becomes marginally 
significant and has a negative sign, i.e. greater political distance between the US and oil-
exporting countries leads to US firms importing significantly less oil.  
The rest of Table 3.2 includes regressions estimated with the Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. The level of oil imports is the dependent 
variable in PPML regressions which allows the inclusion of zero values in the estimation. 
I prefer the PPML specification and employ it to run our baseline regression using the 
datasets that I constructed. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
political distance in all of the PPML regressions shows that political distance has a 
negative effect on oil imports.  
I also test whether the results of Table 3.2 are robust to the oil production control 
variable included instead of oil reserves. In the specifications with oil production (not 
reported in this paper) the negative coefficient for the political distance also prevails, but 
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the coefficient is often insignificant, or it has lower levels of significance on several 
occasions. This also affects the estimates of GDP and population variables, causing them 
to become insignificant. I explain this result by endogeneity of the oil production 
variable.  
 
3.3.2.  Large firms drive the results 
In Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 I present the results for the subsamples of large firms 
to test the hypothesis that mainly large, vertically integrated US oil firms react to changes 
in political relationships between the United States and oil exporting countries.
30
  In 
Table 3.3 the firm is large if its average annual oil imports are greater than the average 
annual imports for the whole sample. In Table 3.4 the firm is large if its total imports are 
bigger than the average total imports for the whole sample. While the two dummy 
variables often coincide, if a firm imports a large quantity of oil but only for a couple of 
years within the overall period, these two dummy variables may serve to put this firm 
into different categories, i.e. large versus small firms.  
As both tables show larger than average firms in our sample appear to drive the 
baseline results. The estimate of the coefficient for political distance is negative and 
significant and also greater in magnitude. The regressions for the subsample of small 
firms defined by using both approaches (the results are not reported) result in 
insignificant estimates for the political distance coefficient. 
                                                          
30
 I am collecting information on overseas investments by the US firms in our sample to directly test the 
hypothesis that the hold-up problem and the risk of expropriation influence import behavior of the US 




3.3.3.  Analysis of different subsamples 
Table 3.5 reports the results specifically for the cold-war period. As expected, the 
effect of political distance on oil imports is more pronounced than that for the period 
1986-2010. The coefficient for political distance is negative, significant and larger in 
magnitude, thus suggesting that US oil-firms diversified their sources of oil supply away 
from the political opponents of the US more actively during the cold-war period. The 
same pattern re-appears for the period after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as shown in  
Table 3.6 where I can observe that the negative coefficients for political distance tend to 
be larger and more significant.  
Another way I restrict our sample is by retaining only the countries that have a 
history of oil nationalizations. I take the list of such countries from Guriev et al. (2011). 
Mityakov et al. (2012) show that the effect of political distance on US oil imports is 
higher for the subsample defined as in Guriev (2011). Table 3.7 reports our results for the 
subsample of countries with a history of oil nationalizations. While the coefficients on 
political distance are similar in magnitude and significance levels to those of the overall 
sample, the regressions for the rest of the subsample of countries that did not nationalize 








I confirm the finding of Mityakov et al (2011, 2012) that US firms imports 
significantly less oil from the political opponents of the United States. In our preferred 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) specification with fixed effects and 
controlling for oil reserves I find that a one standard deviation reduction in political 
distance increases US oil imports by more than 13 percent. I also find that the negative 
effect of political distance on oil imports by US firms is more pronounced for the cold-
war period and the post 9/11 terrorist attack period, suggesting that US oil-firms 
diversified their sources of oil supply away from the political opponents of the US most 
openly during these two periods.  
Moreover, it appears that the negative effect of political distance on oil imports by 
US firms is more pronounced for the subsample of large oil-importing firms compared to 
that for the overall sample. Assuming that large US oil firms
31
 are more likely to have 
overseas investments in oil exploration than small US oil firms, large firms tend to be 
more sensitive to the hold-up and expropriation risks imposed by foreign governments. 
Such risks likely rise when the political relationship between the US and oil exporting 
countries worsens, thus leading to lower oil imports to the US. While data on FDI 
matched to the US firms in our sample would help to quantify the economic costs of oil 
dependence, the findings of this study contribute to the growing literature that identifies 
the influence of international politics on trade patterns.  
                                                          
31
 Large firms are identified by either annual quantity of oil imports or, as an alternative, by total quantity 
of oil they have imported.  
 
Table 3.1.: Descriptive statistics 
     
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
 Dataset 1: 59 countries (6322 observations, 1986-2008) 
     
US Oil Imports 8294.305 18030.72 0 197479 
Political distance (UNGA 
voting) 
.776 .114 .42 .956 
Log exporter’s oil reserves 2.452 1.974 -5.006 5.587 
Log exporter’s production 6.886 1.364 0 9.164 
Log exporter’s GDP 8.539 1.056 5.226 11.370 






















Dependent variable       
         
       
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
              
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
              
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
0.020 -1.015 -1.072 -1.053  -1.262 -1.174  -1.335 -1.174  -1.006 -1.174 
 (0.02) (-1.61) (-1.93) (-1.42)  (-2.26) (-2.02)  (-2.40) (-2.02)  (-1.76) (-2.02) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
0.281 0.001 -0.030 -0.025  0.036 0.048  0.052 0.048  0.041 0.048 
 (6.13) (0.02) (-0.95) (-1.39)  (1.51) (1.46)  (1.95) (1.46)  (1.56) (1.46) 
Log exporter’s GDP -0.031 0.185 0.381 -0.126  0.287 0.158  0.115 0.158  0.353 0.158 
 (-0.22) (1.44) (3.36) (-0.79)  (2.46) (0.97)  (0.96) (0.97)  (2.86) (0.97) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.034 0.046 0.626 -0.450  0.887 0.029  -0.522 0.029  0.626 0.029 
 (0.37) (0.11) (1.93) (-0.87)  (1.74) (0.04)  (-1.28) (0.04)  (1.20) (0.04) 
Year fixed effects yes yes no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects no yes yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 6,047 6,047 6,058 6,058  183,768 183,768  127,312 127,312  72,010 72,010 
Countries 59 59 54 54  59 59  59 59  59 59 
R2 0.118 0.256            
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 
included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm imported for the last time. As a robustness check all 
regressions in this table and the other tables were repeated with the log (exporter’s oil production) in place 
of log (exporter’s oil reserves). While negative coefficient for the political distance variable remains in 
most of the regressions, the coefficient is often insignificant, or has lower significance levels in several 
regressions. I prefer the specification with log (exporter’s oil reserves) because it is less likely to be subject 
to the endogeneity problem.  
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Table 3.3: Distances and US oil imports: Large firms as measured by average annual 
imports 
 FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance  
(UNGA voting) 
-1.171 -1.959  -1.429 -1.463  -1.513 -1.004  -0.818 -0.955 
 (-2.25) (-3.10)  (-2.51) (-2.68)  (-2.72) (-1.69)  (-1.45) (-1.47) 
Log exporter’s oil reserves -0.026 -0.008  0.019 0.029  0.032 0.029  0.023 0.043 
 (-0.68) (-0.40)  (0.92) (1.03)  (1.18) (0.83)  (0.89) (1.23) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.366 -0.195  0.309 0.149  0.216 0.090  0.412 0.078 
 (2.35) (-1.35)  (2.86) (0.89)  (1.99) (0.49)  (3.20) (0.41) 
Log exporter’s population 0.687 -0.147  0.940 -0.009  0.553 -0.049  1.402 -0.012 
 (1.53) (-0.21)  (1.68) (-0.01)  (1.03) (-0.06)  (2.08) (-0.01) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 3,452 3,452  34,162 34,162  27,399 27,399  21,008 21,008 
Countries 51 51  59 59  58 58  58 58 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 





















Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance  
(UNGA voting) 
-1.032 -1.485  -1.429 -1.463  -1.526 -1.463  -0.710 -1.463 
 (-1.54) (-2.09)  (-2.51) (-2.68)  (-2.70) (-2.68)  (-1.27) (-2.68) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.45 -0.02  0.019 0.029  0.025 0.029  0.002 0.029 
 (-0.83) (-0.61)  (0.92) (1.03)  (1.16) (1.03)  (0.10) (1.03) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.354 -0.165  0.309 0.149  0.274 0.149  0.469 0.149 
 (1.99) (-0.92)  (2.86) (0.89)  (2.60) (0.89)  (3.83) (0.89) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.896 -0.207  0.940 -0.009  0.499 -0.009  1.296 -0.009 
 (2.07) (-0.24)  (1.68) (-0.01)  (0.96) (-0.01)  (1.98) (-0.01) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 2,648 2,648  34,162 34,162  31,343 31,343  26,756 26,756 
Countries 50 50  59 59  59 59  59 59 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 





















Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-4.608 -4.681  -5.298 -5.478  -6.152 -5.478  -5.322 -5.478 
 (-1.96) (-2.04)  (-4.92) (-3.03)  (-1.45) (-3.03)  (-2.08) (-3.01) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.059 -0.043  -0.043 -0.037  -0.067 -0.037  -0.030 -0.037 
 (-0.37) (-0.27)  (-0.62) (-0.36)  (-0.24) (-0.36)  (-0.44) (-0.33) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.713 0.657  0.829 0.774  0.718 0.774  0.788 0.774 
 (2.54) (2.36)  (6.70) (6.51)  (2.41) (6.51)  (6.11) (6.51) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
5.941 5.354  9.331 8.814  7.952 8.814  9.021 8.814 
 (2.67) (1.84)  (6.74) (2.19)  (1.76) (2.16)  (3.66) (2.16) 
Year fixed effects no Yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes Yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 825 825  16,536 16,536  7,496 7,496  6,220 6,220 
Countries 34 34  36 36  36 36  36 36 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 
included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm imported for the last time.  
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Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-2.223 -0.045  -1.983 0.083  -2.011 0.083  -1.328 0.083 
 (-2.64) (-0.06)  (-2.31) (0.09)  (-2.39) (0.09)  (-1.51) (0.09) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-1.132 -0.001  1.171 0.230  0.193 0.230  0.118 0.230 
 (-1.18) (-0.02)  (1.27) (1.73)  (1.44) (1.73)  (0.90) (1.73) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.475 -0.182  0.464 0.034  0.376 0.034  0.393 0.034 
 (2.35) (-1.03)  (1.90) (0.15)  (1.56) (0.15)  (1.60) (0.15) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
3.201 -0.192  -0.226 -1.055  -0.891 -1.055  1.576 -1.055 
 (2.46) (-0.07)  (-0.13) (-0.36)  (-0.52) (-0.36)  (0.94) (-0.36) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 2,365 2,365  59,748 59,748  53,016 53,016  23,868 23,868 
Countries 48 48  50 50  50 50  50 50 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 





















Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-0.735 -0.659  -0.873 -1.029  -1.063 -1.029  -0.636 -1.029 
 (-1.16) (-0.95)  (-1.36) (-1.69)  (-1.61) (-1.69)  (-0.95) (-1.69) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.003 -0.017  0.055 0.055  0.053 0.55  0.060 0.055 
 (-0.13) (-0.78)  (1.97) (1.19)  (1.66) (1.19)  (1,93) (1.19) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.332 -0.118  0.198 -0.012  0.059 -0.012  0.272 -0.012 
 (3.12) (-0.65)  (1.75) (-0.07)  (0.53) (-0.07)  (2.20) (-0.07) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.552 -0.336  0.919 -0.162  -0.454 -0.162  0.653 -0.162 
 (1.80) (-0.51)  (1.85) (-0.18)  (-1.16) (-0.18)  (1.28) (-0.18) 
Year fixed effects no Yes  no Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes Yes  yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4439 4439  92664 92664  63608 63608  36267 36267 
Countries 27 27  28 28  28 28  28 28 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 
refers to the original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset 
where zero values are imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further 
transformation of Dataset-2, where missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a 
firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also 
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Appendix A: Details of the essay “The Role of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Relation between Foreign Direct 
Investment and Growth” 
 
A. 1. Sample 1 (103 countries) and sample 2 (79 countries) 
Algeria (1, 2), Argentina (1, 2), Australia (1, 2), Austria (1, 2), Bangladesh (1, 2), 
Belgium (1, 2), Benin (1), Bolivia (1, 2), Botswana (1), Brazil (1, 2), Bulgaria (1), 
Burundi (1), Cameroon (1, 2), Canada (1, 2), Central African Rep. (1), Chile (1, 2), China 
(1, 2), Colombia (1, 2), Congo (1), Costa Rica (1, 2), Cyprus (1, 2), Czech Republic (1), 
Denmark (1, 2), Dominican Rep. (1, 2), Ecuador (1, 2), Egypt (1, 2), El Salvador (1, 2), 
Fiji (1), Finland (1, 2), France (1, 2), Gabon (1), Germany (1, 2), Ghana (1, 2), Greece (1, 
2), Guatemala (1, 2), Guyana (1, 2), Haiti (1, 2), Honduras (1, 2), Hong Kong (1), 
Hungary (1), Iceland (1, 2), India (1, 2), Indonesia (1, 2), Iran (1, 2), Ireland (1, 2), Israel 
(1, 2), Italy (1, 2), Ivory Coast (1, 2), Jamaica (1, 2), Japan (1, 2), Jordan (1, 2), Kenya (1, 
2), Korea (South) (1, 2), Lithuania (1), Malawi (1, 2), Malaysia (1, 2), Mali (1, 2), Malta 
(1), Mauritius (1, 2), Mexico (1, 2), Morocco (1, 2), Nepal (1), Netherlands (1, 2), New 
Zealand (1, 2), Nicaragua (1, 2), Niger (1), Norway (1, 2), Pakistan (1, 2), Panama (1, 2), 
Papua New Guinea (1), Paraguay (1, 2), Peru (1, 2), Philippines (1, 2), Poland (1), 
Portugal (1, 2), Romania (1),  Russian Fed. (1), Rwanda (1, 2), Senegal (1, 2), Sierra 
Leone (1, 2), Singapore (1, 2), Slovak Republic (1), South Africa (1, 2), Spain (1, 2), Sri 
Lanka (1, 2), Sweden (1, 2), Switzerland (1, 2), Syria (1), Tanzania (1, 2), Thailand (1, 
2), Togo (1), Trinidad & Tobago (1, 2), Tunisia (1, 2), Turkey (1, 2), Uganda (1, 2), 
Ukraine (1), United Kingdom (1, 2), United States (1, 2), Uruguay (1, 2), Venezuela (1, 
2), Zaire (Dem Rep Congo) (1), Zambia (1, 2), Zimbabwe (1, 2). 
 
 
A. 2. Data Sources and Descriptions 
Foreign direct investment: Inward FDI flows (US Dollars at current prices and 
current exchange rates in millions). Source: UNCTAD. 
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Output levels: GDP (US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in 
millions). Source: UNCTAD. 
GDP growth rate: (i) Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 1990 US 
dollars); (ii) Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2005 prices, constructed using 
chain method); (iii) Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 2005 prices, constructed 
using Laspeyres method). Source: UNCTAD, PWT 6.3. 
TFP growth rate: Growth rate of total factor productivity, measured as the 
residual,  , in the assumed production function:      (  )   , where    0.35. 
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003). 
Government consumption: General Government final consumption expenditure 
(US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions). Source: UNCTAD. 
Domestic investment: Gross capital formation (US Dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates in millions). Source: UNCTAD. 
Openness: (i) Exports plus imports as a share of GDP (US Dollars at current 
prices and current exchange rates in millions); (ii) Fraser Institute’s Index of Freedom to 
trade internationally (area 4 of Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index). Source: 
UNCTAD, Fraser Institute. 
Schooling: (i) Percentage of Secondary schooling attained in population; (ii) 
Average years of schooling attained. Source: Barro and Lee (2010). 
Inflation: Percentage change in the GDP deflator. Source: World Bank. 
Population: Total population. Source: UNCTAD. 
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Institutions: Index of legal system and property rights (area 2 of Economic Freedom of 
the World (EFW) index). Source: Fraser Institute. 
Finance: Credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of GDP. 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
 
A. 3. The Arellano-Bond GMM technique  
The original Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, also called the “Difference” GMM 
estimator, is designed for the fixed-effects (FE) models where (i) a lagged dependent 
variable is included as a regressor; (ii) some other regressors may be endogenous, and 
(iii) the time dimension for the panel of data is short. Any of these features of the model 
can lead to inconsistent parameter estimates if results are obtained by the standard OLS 
technique. Consistent parameter estimates can be obtained for dynamic panel-data 
models by implementing the Arellano-Bond estimator. If the original equation is of the 
following form: 
 
(4)                            , 
 
where the error term,    , is a composite of unobserved country and time specific 
heterogeneity, and an idiosyncratic component  , such that               . First, 
fixed effects need to be eliminated. Two techniques of dealing with fixed effects can be 
applied: first-differencing and forward orthogonal-deviations. Proposed by Arellano and 
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Bover (1995), the orthogonal-deviations transform subtracts the average of all available 
future observations, and can be computed for every complete observation except the last 
for each individual.
32
 Like differencing, taking orthogonal deviations removes fixed 
effects. Thus, the following equation is constructed: 
 
(5)                                ,  
 
where              and      are the original regressors, transformed by either first-
differencing or forward orthogonal-deviations. Then, the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation of the first-difference model (5), using appropriate lags of regressors as the 
instruments, is applied.  
If the lagged levels of the regressors are poor instruments for the first-differenced 
regressors, the Arellano-Bond “System” GMM estimator should be used, where the 
original equation in levels is used together with the first-differenced equation to obtain 
additional instruments. Thus, the system of equations (4) and (5) is estimated. 
To test whether the instruments as a group are exogenous the Sargan test or 
Hansen J test should be implemented. Also, the AB test for autocorrelation should be 




                                                          
32
 “Difference” GMM is still called that even if orthogonal deviations are implemented. 
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A. 4. Details on the key variables 
The GP index does not incorporate IP enforcement measures and, as noted in Park 
(2008), the index is “an indicator of the strength of patent protection, not the quality of 
patent system”. It explains why, for instance, according to the GP index (see Table 2.14) 
China has the superior IPR regime compared to Hong Kong (the relationship seems 
implausible if enforcement of patent protection is measured).33  
Several other measures of IPR protection exist as separate indexes or as parts of 
more broad indexes of economic freedom and property rights.34 For instance, according 
to the Fraser Institute’s index of Intellectual Property Protection35 assembled based on 
World Economic Forum (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey, which polls around 13,000 
business executives worldwide, Hong Kong has a higher score for IPR protection 
compared to that of China for all the years between 2000 and 2005. In the WEF 
Executive Opinion Survey business executives score the countries based on their 
subjective judgment about how well IPRs are protected, thus enforcement of IPR laws 
together with de jure laws are assessed.  
                                                          
33
 China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the adoption of the second 
amendment of China’s Patent Law brought the IP law into compliance with the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. The amended Patent law of China is reflected in coverage, 
enforcement, and membership components of the GP index, so the components, and the resulted GP index, 
have higher scores in 2005 compared with their values in 2001. There were no changes in Hong Kong 
patent law, and therefore, no changes in GP score for Hong Kong in 2005. 
34 
I was able to collect data for: (i) the IP index from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of World 
Economic Forum (WEF), publicly available for 2008-2010; (ii) Protection of IPR index from the Fraser 
Institute, available as an average for 1995-2000 and annually for 2001-2004; (iii) Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) from the Property Rights Alliance, available annually for 2007-2010.  
35
 Protection of Intellectual Property index was one of the subcomponents of Fraser Institute’ Legal System 
and Property Rights index, which is in turn the component of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
index. However, the computation of the IP component of EFW index was terminated in 2004, and 
substituted for the Protection of Property Rights index component. 
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It seems that at least for China and Hong Kong in 2000-2005, the GP index does 
not show the true state of the IPR laws. However, it is not clear that over a longer period 
and for more countries other IPR indexes would better reflect the differences in IPR 
protection than the GP index. Because other indexes use subjective judgments of the 
questionnaires’ respondents in their construction, it may be hard to keep them 
comparable across time and countries. Instead, the GP index is constructed in a way 
which makes it as objective as possible. Moreover, it is likely that the strength of patent 
law is correlated with its quality, especially if some time lag is allowed. The error in the 
measured quality of IPR protection is not necessarily bigger if enforcement is not 
measured compared with the error if enforcement is measured subjectively. 
Ideally, I would do the correlation analysis of the GP index with other indexes of 
IPR protection and see whether the empirical results of this paper hold if other measures 
of IPR are applied. Unfortunately, no other IPR index is publicly available for a sufficient 
number of countries and a long enough period to test my hypothesis in panel regressions. 
Thus, I use the GP index and leave for further investigation whether my results hold if 
different measures of IPR protection are used. 
UNCTAD defines FDI as an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in and control by a 
resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) of an 
enterprise resident in a different economy (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign 
affiliate). Such investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities 
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and all subsequent transactions between them and among foreign affiliates. FDI includes 
equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
FDI inflows are reported in UNCTADstat on a net basis36 (capital transactions' 
credits less debits between direct investors and their foreign affiliates), thus, the flows 
attracted to the economy, and those that remain in the economy are analyzed. 
Foreign investment stocks, reported in UNCTADstat, are the value of the share of 
the capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, 
plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprises. 
Inflows of FDI are chosen over inward FDI stocks because flow reflects MNE’s 
investment activity over a certain period. If the investment behavior of a foreign firm 
depends on the strength of IPR protection, the regression analysis will be able to capture 
the change in the growth effect of FDI inflow in a domestic economy as the strength of 
the IPR regime varies.  However, it is not clear what the exact time lag is for the FDI 
externalities to be realized by a host economy. Moreover, it is likely that these time lags 
vary between the countries because of the differences in the absorptive capacities, 
developed by the economies. To account for these considerations, FDI stocks are used to 
complement the regression analysis of the investment inflows.   
Crespo and Fontoura (2007) surveyed the literature on the determining factors of 
FDI spillovers and concluded that absorptive capacity of domestic firms and regions is “a 
precondition for incorporating the benefits of FDI spillovers”, and that it produces the 
most robust empirical results. Since aggregated to a country level FDI data are used in 
                                                          
36
 Therefore, negative FDI flows can result if one of the components of FDI (i.e., equity capital, reinvested 
earnings or intra-company loans) is net negative. 
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this study, absorptive capacity at the macroeconomic level, usually associated with the 
development level of a particular country, is controlled for in the growth regressions.  
The development level of an economy is often measured by the stock of human 
capital, which is usually proxied by the percentage of secondary school enrollment in 
total population. As a robustness check, schooling, measured as average years of 
schooling in total population, is also used in the empirical analysis. Both variables are 
available for the years 1950-2010 with 5-years lag from Barro and Lee (2010). 
Another element of the capacity of an economy to absorb technology is the legal 
environment of the country. The Fraser Institute’s index of Legal System and Security of 
Property Rights, which major components are rule of law, security of property rights, an 
independent judiciary, and an impartial court system, is used to control for the quality of 
institutions.  
Also, a country’s openness to trade and investments is essential for the FDI to 
enter the economy. Openness, measured as exports plus imports in the share of GDP, and 
constructed using UNCTADstat data, is included in the regressions. As a robustness 
check, openness measured by the Fraser Institute’s Index of Freedom to Trade 
Internationally, is also used. 
The data on government consumption, imports and exports are obtained from 
UNCTADstat. Since FDI stocks and inflows, government consumption, exports and 
imports are measured in current prices and current exchange rates, GDP in current prices 
and current exchange rates from UNCTADstat is used to construct the FDI/GDP, 
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government consumption as a share of GDP, and exports plus imports as a share of GDP 
variables. Population data is also from UNCTADstat. 
Finally, inflation, measured as an annual percentage change in the GDP deflator, 
is obtained from World Bank. 
 
A. 5. Further robustness checks 
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.7 of the Appendix A I estimate cross-country 
regressions (one observation per country), using my full sample.  
Similarly to the panel regressions shown in Table 2.7, for the full sample of 
countries I do not find the positive and significant interaction of FDI and Finance, 
showed in Alfaro et al. (2004, 2009). However, when I restrict my sample to be as close 
as possible to Alfaro et al. (2009) in terms of the coverage of countries and the time 
period, the interaction of FDI and Finance as well as Finance independently become 
significant (see columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.9). This suggests the sensitivity of Alfaro’s 
(2004, 2009) results to the selection of countries, time period and the estimation method 
(i.e., panel versus cross-section).  
As for the major finding of this study that the interaction of FDI and IPR is 
negative and significant, this result is not found in cross-country regressions. As I argue 
in the main text, simple cross-country regressions are subject to several econometric 
problems, which might lead to inconsistent estimates.  Panel analysis, presented in the 
main sections, is chosen instead (and the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator in particular) to 
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elicit consistent estimates of the parameters of explanatory variables, including FDI, IPR 
and the interaction of FDI and IPR.   
As an additional robustness check, in Table 2.11 of the Appendix A I show the 
results of estimation where I include four dummy variables for different levels of the IPR 
index because IPR might have a heterogeneous impact on growth depending on its level. 
The main results are unchanged. 
Finally, the concern might arise that a 5-year period is too short to reveal the 
dynamic of the model and instead the regressions pick up the effect of business cycles. In 
Table 2.12 of the Appendix A I address this point by estimating GDP regressions where 




Appendix A - Table 2.7: Further robustness checks: Cross-sectional setting 
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
FDI -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 -0.35 
 (-1.10) (-0.57) (-1.03) (-0.54) (-0.82) (-0.94) 
IP -0.002 - -0.002 -0.001 - -0.004 
 (-0.71) - (-0.68) (-0.17) - (-0.97) 
IP*FDI 0.09 - 0.14 0.13 - -0.07 
 (0.97) - (1.48) (0.54) - (-0.24) 
Finance - 0.004 0.004 - 0.01 0.01 
 - (1.56) (1.83) - (3.75) (3.31) 
Finance*FDI - -0.09 -0.13 - 0.46 0.61 
 - (-0.73) (-1.01) - (1.88) (1.54) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-3.07) (-3.73) (-3.52) (-2.87) (-3.62) (-2.92) 
Schooling 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (2.46) (2.40) (2.66) (1.55) (2.17) (2.29) 
Government Consumption -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-1.10) (-1.17) (-1.08) (-1.29) (-1.13) (-1.00) 
Institutions 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.003 0.003 
 (3.45) (2.81) (2.73) (3.33) (2.30) (2.37) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-3.07) (-1.66) (-1.56) (-1.35) (-0.59) (-1.08) 
Openness 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 
 (2.53) (1.78) (1.90) (1.34) (0.60) (0.45) 
African Dummy -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (-3.08) (-2.68) (-2.56) (-4.15) (-4.14) (-3.40) 
       
R
2
 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.56 0.57 
Observations 95 95 95 66 66 66 
       
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 95 
countries and covers the period of 1970-2009 (in addition to China, Nicaragua, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, for 
which Finance variable is not available, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Russia and Slovakia are not in the 
sample because for the year 1970 the log (Initial GDP) variable is not available). In the columns (4), (5) 
and (6) the sample is further restricted to closely follow that of Alfaro et al. (2009); the restricted sample 
covers the period of 1975-95 and due to data limitations does not include Belgium, Gambia, Indonesia, 




Appendix A - Table 2.8: Further robustness checks: Components of the Ginarte-Park 
index  
Dependent variable - 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
    
 (1) (2)  
 OLS OLS-FE  
    
FDI 0.09 0.09  
 (2.33) (1.98)  
Coverage -0.01 0.003  
 (-1.22) (0.40)  
Duration 0.01 0.003  
 (0.76) (0.25)  
Enforcement 0.01 0.003  
 (1.69) (0.64)  
Loss of Rights -0.002 -0.004  
 (-0.45) (0.49)  
Membership 0.01 0.03  
 (2.48) (3.34)  
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04  
 (-6.12) (-7.95)  
Schooling 0.02 -0.01  
 (2.55) (-0.89)  
Government Consumption -0.06 -0.08  
 (-3.01) (-2.01)  
Institutions 0.004 0.004  
 (5.54) (3.58)  
Inflation -0.002 -0.001  
 (-13.66) (-5.73)  
Openness 0.01 0.02  
 (2.74) (2.63)  
African Dummy -0.02 -0.11  
 (-5.37) (-5.60)  
    
R
2
 0.25 0.57  
Country fixed effects No Yes  
Year       fixed effects No Yes  
Observations 652 652  
    
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. The sample consists of 103 
countries. For the list of countries and the detailed definitions of the variables see the Appendix A and the 
notes to Table 2.1. Coverage, Duration, Enforcement, Loss of Rights and Membership are the components 




Appendix A - Table 2.9: Further robustness checks: Standard errors clustered by 
country  
      
 GDP Growth  TFP Growth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS-FE  OLS OLS-FE 
      
FDI 0.16 0.21  0.24 0.25 
 (2.50) (2.94)  (4.69) (3.69) 
IPR 0.004 0.01  0.001 -0.001 
 (1.82) (3.04)  (0.75) (-0.37) 
FDI*IPR -0.09 -0.16  -0.18 -0.22 
 (-1.66) (-2.53)  (-1.86) (-2.29) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04  -0.01 -0.03 
 (-4.43) (-6.40)  (-3.74) (-2.60) 
Schooling 0.02 -0.01  0.001 -0.02 
 (1.50) (-0.71)  (0.09) (-1.05) 
Government Consumption -0.06 -0.07  -0.01 0.002 
 (-2.12) (-1.39)  (-0.54) (0.03) 
Institutions 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.001 
 (5.42) (3.41)  (6.20) (1.19) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
 (-11.99) (-7.00)  (-3.30) (-2.67) 
Openness 0.01 0.02  -0.002 0.03 
 (2.29) (1.90)  (-1.49) (3.03) 
African Dummy -0.02 0.01  -0.004 0.03 
 (-3.93) (0.72)  (-0.80) (1.14) 
      
R
2
 0.25 0.57  0.16 0.45 
Country fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
Year       fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 652 652  652 652 
      
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values, calculated with standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses. The GDP sample consists of 103 countries and TFP sample consists of 79 
countries. For the list of countries and the detailed definitions of the variables see Section A.2 of the 
Appendix A and the notes to Table 2.1. The country-specific means are subtracted from FDI and IPR 




Appendix A - Table 2.10: Exploring the offsetting effects between FDI and IPR 
Dependent variable - 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
   





   
FDI 0.81 0.73 
 (3.93) (3.14) 
IPR 0.01 0.01 
 (4.49) (3.93) 
FDI*IPR -0.19 -0.16 
 (-3.61) (-2.38) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.02 -0.02 
 (-3.81) (-3.78) 
Schooling 0.02 0.03 
 (0.67) (0.94) 
Government Consumption -0.10 -0.11 
 (-2.28) (-2.19) 
Institutions 0.01 0.002 
 (0.81) (0.96) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 
 (-3.69) (-3.51) 
Openness 0.01 0.01 
 (1.22) (1.34) 
   
Hansen             test (p-level) 0.15 0.16 
Arellano-Bond test (p-level) 0.26 0.34 
Number of instruments 79 79 
Observations 549 544 
   
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. In column (2) the 
observations which might be considered the outliers (the 99
th
 percentile of the distribution of FDI) are 




Appendix A - Table 2.11: Further robustness checks: Discrete levels of IPR  
Dependent variable – 5-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








       
FDI 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.10 
 (2.94) (1.91) (1.78) (1.55) (3.28) (1.58) 
IPR (1-2) 0.01 0.003 0.0004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (2.11) (0.50) (0.05) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) 
IPR (2-3) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.004 0.01 
 (2.51) (0.67) (0.72) (0.27) (0.57) (0.66) 
IPR (3-4) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (3.10) (1.72) (1.85) (1.79) (2.31) (1.72) 
IPR (4-5) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (2.57) (1.86) (2.04) (1.95) (1.77) (1.77) 
FDI*IPR - - 0.17 0.13 -0.18 0.02 
 - - (1.57) (1.70) (-2.90) (0.28) 
log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-5.80) (-7.50) (-6.99) (-7.48) (-7.04) (-7.47) 
Schooling 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (2.01) (-0.74) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.75) (-0.75) 
Government Consumption -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-2.44) (-1.61) (-1.69) (-1.70) (-1.63) (-1.60) 
Institutions 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (5.65) (3.31) (3.08) (3.30) (3.27) (3.31) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-10.51) (-6.07) (-6.07) (-5.67) (-5.79) (-6.06) 
Openness 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (2.45) (2.87) (2.86) (3.05) (3.12) (2.86) 
African Dummy -0.02 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.001 
 (-5.95) (0.09) (0.29) (0.11) (0.28) (0.07) 
       
R
2
 0.25 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year       fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
       
 
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. Robust t-values are in parentheses. All regressions include four 
dummy variables for different levels of the IPR index (the values are shown in the parentheses). In columns 








Appendix A - Table 2.12: Further robustness checks: 10-year analysis 
Dependent variable – 10-year average annual per capita GDP growth rate 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE 
    
FDI 0.26 0.23 0.33 
 (2.79) (2.74) (3.17) 
IPR 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.90) (3.39) (2.53) 
FDI*IPR -0.28 -0.22 -0.29 
 (-2.23) (-1.92) (-2.29) 
Finance - - -0.003 
 - - (-1.27) 
Domestic Investment - 0.14 - 
 - (4.25) - 
log (Initial GDP) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-2.10) (-2.67) (-2.95) 
Schooling -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-1.47) (-1.50) (-0.54) 
Government Consumption -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 
 (-2.12) (-2.22) (-2.69) 
Institutions 0.01 0.004 0.004 
 (3.30) (2.59) (2.77) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-5.60) (-4.63) (-5.55) 
Openness -0.003 -0.01 0.002 
 (-0.40) (-1.21) (0.18) 
African Dummy -0.03 -0.01 0.04 
 (-1.39) (-0.68) (3.56) 
    
R
2
 0.68 0.71 0.68 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year       fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 334 334 310 
    
 





Appendix A - Table 2.13: Detailed statistics for FDI and IPR 
     
FDI 
     
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% -0.01 -0.05   
5% 0.0003 -0.03   
10% 0.001 -0.02 Obs 652 
25% 0.004 -0.01   
     
50% 0.01  Mean 0.02 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.03 
75% 0.03 0.20   
90% 0.06 0.22 Variance 0.001 
95% 0.08 0.24 Skewness 3.15 
99% 0.16 0.26 Kurtosis 16.87 
     
IPR 
     
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.59 0   
5% 1.03 0   
10% 1.2 0 Obs 652 
25% 1.7 0.13   
     
50% 2.39  Mean 2.55 
  Largest Std. Dev. 1.09 
75% 3.37 4.675   
90% 4.18 4.675 Variance 1.19 
95% 4.5 4.675 Skewness 0.28 
99% 4.67 4.675 Kurtosis 2.15 
     
 
Notes: The sample consists of 103 countries. For the list of countries and the detailed definitions of the 




Appendix A - Table 2.14: Ginarte-Park index 
Country Average 1960-90 1995 2000 2005 
Algeria 2.74 2.74 3.07 3.07  
Argentina 1.60 2.73 3.98 3.98  
Australia 2.35 4.17 4.17 4.17  
Austria 2.96 4.21 4.33 4.33  
Bangladesh 1.34 1.87 1.87 1.87  
Belgium 3.39 4.54 4.67 4.67  
Benin 1.64 1.78 2.10 2.93  
Bolivia 1.38 2.37 3.43 3.43  
Botswana 1.59 2.08 3.32 3.52  
Brazil 1.22 1.48 3.59 3.59  
Bulgaria 1.83 3.23 4.42 4.54  
Burundi 1.98 2.15 2.15 2.15  
Cameroon 1.74 2.10 2.23 3.06  
Canada 3.00 4.34 4.67 4.67  
Central African Rep. 1.74 1.98 2.10 2.93  
Chile 2.04 3.91 4.28 4.28  
China 1.33 2.12 3.09 4.08  
Colombia 1.05 2.74 3.59 3.72  
Congo 1.74 1.90 2.23 3.06  
Costa Rica 1.07 1.56 2.89 2.89  
Cyprus 2.52 2.78 3.48 3.48  
Czech Republic - 2.96 3.21 4.33  
Denmark 2.88 4.54 4.67 4.67  
Dominican Rep. 2.12 2.32 2.45 2.82  
Ecuador 1.16 2.04 3.73 3.73  
Egypt 1.41 1.73 1.86 2.77  
El Salvador 1.71 3.23 3.36 3.48  
Fiji 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.40  
Finland 2.64 4.42 4.54 4.67  
France 3.29 4.54 4.67 4.67  
Gabon 1.74 2.10 2.23 3.06  
Germany 3.24 4.17 4.50 4.50  
Ghana 1.47 2.83 3.15 3.35  
Greece 2.40 3.47 3.97 4.30  
Guatemala 0.77 1.08 1.28 3.15  
Guyana 0.82 1.13 1.33 1.78  
Haiti 2.58 2.58 2.90 2.90  
Honduras 1.25 1.90 2.86 2.98  
Hong Kong 2.44 2.90 3.81 3.81  
Hungary 2.20 4.04 4.04 4.50  
Iceland 1.67 2.68 3.38 3.51  
India 1.03 1.23 2.27 3.76  
Indonesia 0.00 1.56 2.47 2.77  
Iran 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91  
Ireland 2.15 4.14 4.67 4.67  
Israel 2.76 3.14 4.13 4.13  
Italy 3.16 4.33 4.67 4.67  
Jamaica 2.66 2.86 3.06 3.36 




Table 2.14 (continued) 
   
Jordan 0.66 1.08 3.03 3.43 
Kenya 1.55 2.43 2.88 3.22 
Korea (South) 2.55 3.89 4.13 4.33  
Lithuania - 2.69 3.48 4.00  
Malaysia 1.70 2.70 3.03 3.48  
Mali 1.78 1.98 2.10 2.93  
Malta 1.34 1.60 3.18 3.48  
Mauritius 1.62 1.93 1.93 2.57  
Mexico 1.19 3.14 3.68 3.88  
Morocco 1.58 1.78 3.06 3.52  
Nepal 1.79 1.79 1.79 2.19  
Netherlands 3.43 4.54 4.67 4.67  
New Zealand 2.67 4.01 4.01 4.01  
Nicaragua 0.92 1.12 2.16 2.97  
Niger 1.64 1.78 2.10 2.93  
Norway 2.75 3.88 4.00 4.17  
Pakistan 1.09 1.38 2.20 2.40  
Panama 1.34 1.46 3.64 3.64  
Papua New Guinea 0.00 0.00 1.40 1.60  
Paraguay 1.13 1.53 2.39 2.89  
Philippines 2.19 2.56 3.98 4.18  
Poland 1.38 3.46 3.92 4.21  
Portugal 1.48 3.35 4.01 4.38  
Romania 1.50 3.52 3.72 4.17  
Russian Fed. - 3.48 3.68 3.68  
Rwanda 1.94 1.95 2.28 2.28  
Senegal 1.70 1.98 2.10 2.93  
Sierra Leone 2.38 2.45 2.98 2.98  
Singapore 1.64 3.88 4.01 4.21  
Slovak Republic - 2.96 2.76 4.21  
South Africa 2.94 3.39 4.25 4.25  
Spain 2.74 4.21 4.33 4.33  
Sweden 2.86 4.42 4.54 4.54  
Switzerland 3.04 4.21 4.33 4.33  
Syria 1.68 1.87 1.99 2.19  
Tanzania 1.84 2.32 2.64 2.64  
Thailand 0.95 2.41 2.53 2.66  
Togo 1.60 1.98 2.10 2.93  
Trinidad & Tobago 1.78 2.33 3.63 3.75  
Tunisia 1.45 1.65 2.32 3.25  
Turkey 1.16 2.65 4.01 4.01  
Uganda 1.77 2.85 2.98 2.98 
Ukraine - 3.68 3.68 3.68 
United Kingdom 3.20 4.54 4.54 4.54 
United States 4.14 4.88 4.88 4.88 
Uruguay 1.54 2.07 3.27 3.39 
Venezuela 0.92 2.82 3.32 3.32 
Zaire  1.49 1.58 1.78 2.23 
Zambia 1.54 1.62 1.74 1.94 
Zimbabwe 1.61 2.28 2.60 2.60 
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Appendix B: Details of the essay “Political limits on the 
World Oil Trade: Firm-level Evidence from US firms” 
 
B. 1. Sample of oil exporting countries (59 countries) 
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Belize, Brunei, 
Belarus, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Dem. 
Rep.), Benin, Denmark, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Cote d`Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Oman, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, South Africa, Spain, 
Syria, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, 
Venezuela, Yemen.  
 
 
